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ABSTRACT 
The Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness (SASSA) program is a congressionally 
initiated technology demonstration program run by the Air Force, Space and Missile 
System Center (SMC), Los Angeles Air Force Base. Initiated October 2008, SASSA is 
investigating the feasibility of a highly flexible and adaptable satellite payload system for 
detecting satellite threats, both natural and manmade.  The SASSA program was given 
cost and schedule limitations with a mandate to deliver hardware for demonstration in 24 
months, considered a “rapid acquisition” by AF and SMC standards. This study provides 
an assessment of how the SASSA program tailored systems engineering processes to 
implement a “rapid space acquisition.” Acquisition and engineering standards define a 
roadmap for military procurements to produce the most effective product at the most 
reasonable cost. Refinement of these standards over time is critical to the continued 
success of acquisition systems to evolve a current and effective military. This study 
reviews the SASSA concept and technology demonstration, surveys standard systems 
engineering guidance, catalogues systems engineering processes tailored, and assesses 
effectiveness of this tailoring. This study will provide observation and assessment of real-
world results, successful and unsuccessful, for the purposes of capturing and 
documenting lessons learned towards successfully accomplishing rapid space 
acquisitions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Spurred by the 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT) event, the Self Awareness 
Space Situational Awareness (SASSA) technology demonstration program was 
established to evolve the concept of Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which would 
address local satellite awareness, as well as contribute to global awareness of space 
objects. SASSA has also sought to find a reasonable path for a more pervasive and 
accessible solution to local satellite threat warning, versus current satellite-specific 
implementations. The SASSA program utilizes the paradigm that an understanding of the 
local threat environment enables the possibility of action towards threat protection. A 
potential solution being demonstrated by SASSA is to develop adaptable and flexible 
space and ground elements whose primary aspects remain the same while peripherals are 
adapted to specific threat warning needs. This concept, once matured, may lead to a “one-
size-fits-most” product line for threat warning systems. Conceptually the SASSA 
architecture would be capable of integrating various threat warning sensor suites with 
well-defined standard interfaces on satellite vehicles. This concept applied across the 
U.S.’ space assets could dramatically increase our understanding of the natural and 
manmade space environment, ultimately enabling significantly enhanced protection 
capabilities for our national space assets. 
B.  PURPOSE 
This thesis describes and evaluates the tailoring of SE guidance for DoD 
acquisitions for a smaller, rapid space acquisition program.  An inherent assumption is 
that there is a standard body of systems engineering guidance provided to the DoD 
community from which to develop and draw direction for how to implement and apply 




tailored systems engineering guidance and documents lessons learned, applicable to like 
systems in the future, for effectively supporting the delivery of a rapid-paced space 
satellite payload acquisition. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The goal of this study is to use the SASSA program as a case study for the 
effectiveness of tailoring standard systems engineering processes such as: developing 
objectives, requirements, specifications, milestones reviews, assembly, integration and 
test (AI&T), and validation/ verification of requirements in order to support the delivery 
of a rapid pace, cost constrained satellite payload acquisition.  The study questions 
investigated are as follows:  
 
1) What are the standard systems engineering guidance sources available and expected to 
be used by DoD space program systems engineers? 
 Means to find answer: Perform survey of DoD and industry standard systems 
engineering guidance sources available to DoD space program systems engineers.  
 
2) What are the standard systems engineering processes that SASSA effectively tailored 
to be more effective for rapid acquisitions? 
 Means to find answer: Observations/results from actual program, quantifiable data 
from program where possible.  
 
3) Study Questions: What are the standard systems engineering processes that SASSA 
did not effectively modify to be more effective for rapid acquisitions? 
 Means to find answer: Observations/results from actual program, quantifiable data 
from program where possible. 
 
D.  BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study provides a listing of DoD and industry standard systems engineering 
sources recommended to government personnel in performing systems engineering on 
DoD space programs. This list of sources comprises the body of source material, which 
defines “standard” SE processes. This provides a context for the observation and 
assessment of real world results in the implementation of tailored standard SE processes, 
both successful and unsuccessful.  This is hoped to benefit process innovation of standard 
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systems engineering guidance and standards in the DoD acquisition framework, which is 
critical to the continued success and optimization of acquisition systems to sustain a 
current and effective military. It may also benefit other military acquisitions which are of 
similar size and pace, especially rapid space acquisitions by observing actual tailored 
processes implemented and their lessons learned. Specifically, this thesis supports this 
through providing: 
 a)  A listing of standard systems engineering guidance for DoD space programs 
b)  Real world examples of tailored SE processes for rapid space payload 
acquisitions 
c)  Evaluation of these processes for effectiveness towards rapid space acquisition  
d)  Observations and recommendations for improving SE processes for space 
acquisitions particularly rapid space acquisitions  
E.  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1.  Scope 
The scope of this thesis topic is limited to identifying and analyzing systems 
engineering processes that have already been accomplished on an Air Force satellite 
payload acquisition from summer 2007 to present (currently post CDR). Firsthand 
experience provided from the researcher as well as other participants in the government 
program management and technical oversight team are used.  
2. Methodology 
The approach to accomplishing this study involved four phases. The first phase of 
this study started with a survey of industry and DoD standard systems engineering 
guidance documents to define a set of authoritative systems engineering source material. 
Once a body of authoritative material for SE guidance was established, then a survey of 
this material was conducted to find areas where the SASSA program tailored their SE 
practices.  
The second phase compared and identified areas of difference between 
authoritative SE guidance identified and processes implemented in the SASSA program. 
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A catalogue of standard SE processes which were tailored for SASSA was created. The 
discussion includes a description of the standard guidance from the authoritative source 
documents, the corollary process implemented by SASSA, and an identification of the 
differences between the two.  
The third phase utilized the data identified in phase two for tailored processes and 
attempted to assess whether or not each process implemented was successful or 
unsuccessful towards achieving the goal of a rapid space payload acquisition. For each 
process, a case was presented either advocating for or against the process implementation 
as effective or not effective.  
The final phase of the study included capturing the conclusions drawn in the 
previous phases. The final chapter focused on the applications of the study.  This started 
by discussing recommendations for changes to standard guidance as a result of the 
research gathered in this study. The next section was a collection of recommendations for 
programs that have similar characteristics to the SASSA program in size or pace for 
achieving a rapid acquisition.  
F.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The completion of this study has yielded an assessment of the effectiveness of 
tailored SE processes on the SASSA program in achieving the cost, schedule, and 
technical goals in a rapid space acquisition. This study assessed six standard SE processes 
as tailored by the SASSA program. Of these six, one was judged as a neutral contribution 
while five were judged as helpful in achieving the program goals. No tailored processes 
were judged as negative contributions to meeting the rapid space acquisitions goals. 




SASSA Modifications Benefits Risks Contribution 
Requirements 
Development 
- No JCIDS process 
involvement/ utilization 
- No formal stakeholder 
involvement 
- No KPP/KPA’s 
- Strong traceability 
from goals to req.’s 
- Clear traceability 
from original goals 
to req.’s 
- Allowed program 
to move more 
quickly than a JCIDs 
program 
- Potential lack of 
insight into final 
capability with no 
interim KPP/KPA 
assessment 
- Output capability of 






 users (potential)  
Modified SE 
Process 





- Gov imposed design 
aspects (TRL, HW 
units, heritage req.’s) 
- Defined Functional 
elements - Minimize 
inefficient/wasted 
design effort 
- Focus program on 
likely solutions 
- High probability of 
plausible options 
- Miss inventive or 
creative solutions 






- No government or 
contractor SEP,SEMP, 
SEMS, or SEDS 
- Use of RFP, IMS, 
CDRLs for SE process 
- Program meetings to 
define processes 
- Use of Contractor 
processes 
- Saved resources for 
Gov and contractor 
- Less documentation 
- Less overall tasks 
- Gov does not see 
potential deficient SE 
plans of contractor 
- Gov is unclear on 










- No dedicated SE lead 
on government team 
- Team SE process 




- Lack of adequate 
SE 
- Inconsistent SE  
process 
- Critically dependant 





- SRR before IBR 
- Entry/Exit criteria not 
generated before 
program initiation 
- Criteria not in 
SEM(P) 
- No completely 
independent  reviewers 








program needs from 
the start 
- Save resources 
- Thorough reviews 
 
- Contractor not 
understanding  tech 
event criteria in 
planning resources 
for baseline 
- Under scope 
resources 
- Too much in one 
review for larger 
programs 











- “Flat”, versatile 
government team 
structure vice IPT 
structure 
- More expertise 
exposed to more 
tasks  
- surge capability for 
quick task 
completion 
- Entire team up to 
date on critical issues 
- Counteracts stove 
piped thinking 
- Good fit for 
minimal Gov 
resources 
- Entire team aware 
of program status 
- Too much 
information for all to 
absorb as program 
grows 
- Lack of ability to 
have needed depth in 
focused area in large 
programs 
- Lack of consistent 
follow 
through/tracking of 











Table 1.   Summary of Tailored Standard Systems Engineering Processes 
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These conclusions lead the researcher to have recommendations for the 
application of the study:  
1. Recommendations for the Systems Engineering Community 
 Perform a survey of SE guidance for military acquisitions and ensure there is 
comprehensive coverage of SE processes (as opposed to SE technical 
management). 
o Publish a Primer which points to or consolidates this “how to do SE in the 
military” for ease of use and proliferation 
 Create a new SE guidance or append the present guidance which would instruct 
on how to practically implement and accomplish SE processes on non-formal/ 
non JCID’s programs 
 Create a new SE guidance or append the present guidance for recommendations 
on how to tailor standard guidance for non-formal/ non JCID’s programs 
o Address the importance and relationship of the large number of small 
technology and acquisition efforts to the larger formal programs and 
JCIDS process. Good SE is needed even in these small programs to be 
efficient in technology maturation as it relates to larger programs 
 Continue to instruct in basic SE application and build a strong foundational 
knowledge of accomplishing SE processes in SE students 
o Advocate for high levels of practical implementation instruction for doing 
SE in military programs at universities and especially in military higher 
education facilities 
2.  Recommendations for Accomplishing Rapid Space Acquisitions 
 Observe and consider the positive contributions made on the SASSA program by 
tailoring standard SE guidance  
 7
 Tailor standard SE guidance and choose quality teams using “value added” as a 
prime criteria 
 Ensure processes proposed are followed throughout acquisition regardless of if 
they were tailored or not  
 Assemble teams that have experienced and SE knowledgeable personnel as a 
“non-negotiable” 
 Ensure processes proposed are followed throughout acquisition, regardless of if 
they were tailored or not 
 Provide strong SE leadership on the team  
 
 8
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 9
II.  SASSA: ORIGINS AND OVERVIEW OF THE SASSA 
PROGRAM 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Space capabilities are intrinsically woven into Americans’ lives, both civilian and 
military. These include communication (e.g., DirecTV, XM Radio, global cell phone 
nets, global relay of communication/information), navigation, weather, environmental 
monitoring and earth science, and military/national missions (including ISR, missile 
warning, battle space awareness, and intelligence, just to name a few). We are highly 
reliant on our space assets as a nation. The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy underscores 
this by stating that “space is a vital national interest.” The populating of space with U.S. 
technologies, and the application of those technologies, is essential for the prosperity of 
the U.S. and global economies. It links the globe and speeds the flow of information. It is 
becoming a growing critical aspect of many areas of our way of life and government. 
This will result in an increased stake in protecting our national security interests, 
intelligence, military uses, and conduct of U.S. diplomacy—ultimately to protecting lives 
and the environment.  
This same space infrastructure is fragile. Space systems are increasingly 
vulnerable to a variety of natural and man-made threats: space weather and debris; radio 
frequency jamming; laser dazzling and blinding; kinetic intercept vehicles; and space 
mines are just a few examples. The U.S. has no robust Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) capability to unambiguously distinguish between an attack on a satellite or a 
naturally caused anomaly, especially “in situ.” The Commission to Assess National 
Security Space Management and Organization summarizes the theme with this statement: 
If the U.S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the 
possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems. The nation’s leaders must 
assure that the vulnerability of the United States is reduced and that the 
consequences of a surprise attack on U.S. space assets are limited in their 
effects. (2001, January 11)   
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Various discussion and documents support this growing emphasis on the 
criticality of the SSA of our space assets. “Counterspace operations have defensive and 
offensive elements, both of which depend on robust space situation awareness.” (Gen 
John T. Jumper, Foreword to AFDD2-2.1, Counterspace Operations). The 
USSTRATCOM JCD for Space Control (28 Jul 06) states:  
SSA must enable timely and accurate resolution between attacks and 
anomalies affecting US capabilities, [and]…monitor, characterize, predict, 
and report on the space related environment…detect, process, and report 
space events….characterize, assess, and resolve anomalies/attacks on all 
space systems.  
The Space System Attack ID & Characterization Capability MNS (27 Jun 00) relates 
needed capabilities by listing “2.a.(1) “Detect and report attacks on space systems”; 
2.a.(2) “Identify and characterize attacking systems”; 2.a.(4) “Capabilities must be rapid, 
accurate, reliable and interoperable”  
Our nation, moving rapidly forward in technological maturity must take time to 
address the combination of a growing reliance on space assets with the increasing 
vulnerability of those same assets. The Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness 
(SASSA) program is one of a handful of Air Force space acquisitions programs that was 
created to start addressing these issues moving into the future.  
B.  THE SASSA TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATOR DESCRIPTION 
1.  Acquisition Strategy 
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) requires all programs to have an 
approved acquisition strategy. The approval process starts at the smallest program office 
element in the Squadron and filters up through the Group, Wing, and then Center 
approval chain processes (if the program is large enough). SASSA received its 
acquisition strategy approval on June 2008 and was required to get Center level approval. 
In preparation for this milestone event, the SASSA program office initiated a 
series of activities including:  
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 Call for white papers for possible threat warning instruments 
 SMC survey of available satellite secondary payload volume, mass, and power  
 Survey of possible host vehicles in progress and their relative timelines for 
development 
 Review of available satellite bus user guides 
 Review of industry standard electrical data bus utilization 
 Review of possible acquisition methods with pros and cons (e.g., Sole Source, 
Full and Open competition, University or UART) 
 Financial and budget analysis  
 Industry Day Briefing with individual company Q&A sessions for feedback 
The synthesis of these activities led to a decision to pursue a full and open 
competition to develop space-qualified hardware for a one-year on-orbit demonstration. 
This included releasing an RFP and completing a source selection. Due to overwhelming 
industry feedback, the program office seized a unique opportunity and chose to award 
two contracts (Cost Plus Fixed Fee) out of the source selection instead of a single award. 
These two contract awards were envisioned to be in competition for the entire 24-month 
period of performance towards a final selection at flight hardware delivery. The winner of 
the competition was to be awarded the opportunity for integration onto a host satellite 
with an activation of an option for one year of on orbit operation to perform technology 
demonstrations with the selected hardware. To select the winner a Flight Selection Plan 
was developed which weighed various criteria including overall performance, cost, 
schedule, and verification against the program’s Technical Requirements Document 
(TRD).  
2.  Timeline and Milestones 
Figure 1 depicts the relative durations of the SASSA technology demonstration, 
rapid space acquisition.   
 
Figure 1.   SASSA Program Timeline 
3.  System Description Overview 
a.  System Description 
The SASSA technology demonstrator will consist of space, ground and 
test segments. The SASSA program leveraged mature and proven technologies and 
subsystems to demonstrate a viable threat warning architecture.  It was designed to be 
minimally intrusive to the hosting satellite system (both space and ground segments.) The 
SASSA technology demonstrator space segment is designed to operate in low earth orbits 
(LEO) between 400 km and 1200 km.  
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b.  Space Segment 
The SASSA space segment consists of the common interface unit (CIU), 
two instruments—a radar warning receiver (RWR) and an independent dedicated satellite 
communication capability (DSC), an MCU-110 encryption/decryption device, the 
mounting structure, and all associated cabling/harness and software necessary to operate 
the SASSA payload. The CIU will provide the ability to support integration on heritage 
and new development spacecraft and facilitate integration of a wide range of threat 
warning instruments by providing a variety of current data interfaces. These include 
1553, SpaceWire, or RS-422 for the host satellite interface and the same plus a compact 
preconfigured interface (cPCI) type for custom interfaces. The CIU also provides a single 
electrical power interface to the host vehicle, provides power distribution and control of 
instrument power, fault management, time & position services, data handling & control, 
and on-board data storage.   
During mission operations, encrypted commands are received over one of 
two possible communications paths.  The first path is via the host space vehicle interface. 
The second is via the dedicated stand-alone communications (DSC) instrument. Timed 
commands are decrypted and authenticated prior to executing the commands in the CIU.  
Mission data received from the instruments is formatted by the CIU into telemetry frames 
and encrypted prior to sending data back via either communication path. The CIU uses 
the MCU-110 encryptor to perform the telemetry stream encryption and command 
decryption from the host satellite data bus and NSA approved SGLS transponder for the 
DSC.  Since the CIU is handling both encrypted and plain text data, the CIU has a 
security partition to maintain security isolation. One side of the CIU is responsible for 
interfacing to the host space vehicle and the other is responsible for interfacing to the 
instruments. 
The instruments receive power, configuration commands, mission data 
files, timing, and ephemeris knowledge from the CIU. The instruments send health and  
status telemetry and mission data to the CIU.  The health and status telemetry includes 
data collected by the CIU for analog temperature monitors, analog voltage monitors, and 
digital status telemetry. 
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The SASSA Space Segment mounts mechanically to the host satellite 
structure and receives thermal control, power, timing, position/velocity/ephemeris data, 
and passes encrypted command files sent from the SASSA ground. In return, the SASSA 
space segment provides the host space vehicle unencrypted telemetry of digital data 
collected by the CIU for analog temperature, voltage, and current monitors as well as 
encrypted mission data/ telemetry files.  
c.  Ground Segment 
The SASSA ground segment provides command and control, mission 
planning, and processing/displaying of SASSA space segment information. This includes 
mission data analysis and display, archiving and trending, threat reporting, and aiding in 
anomaly resolution.  The ground segment also can provide processed SASSA instrument 
data to external users by using the HTTP protocol and posting XML formatted data.  The 
ground segment can interface to or reside inside the host satellite ground station. In either 
location, the SASSA ground segment can send and receive information from both the 
host satellite communication path or directly via the AFSCN network and the SASSA 
DSC instrument.    
The SASSA ground segment consists of three subsystems. The Command, 
Control and Status Subsystem (CCS) provides the communication control to the host 
ground station or the AFSCN network. The CCS also provides for the execution of 
command plans and the health and status display and alerting.  The second subsystem is 
the Mission Planning and analysis (MPA) subsystem. MPA performs the operations 
scheduling, SASSA instrument and payload resource deconfliction, and timed command 
and command plan generation.  The Instrument Mission Data Analysis Subsystem 
performs the mission data and non-mission data packet processing, data analysis, 
trending, and reporting.  The Instrument Mission Data Analysis Subsystem provides a 
Web-based HTTP interface for either browsing by SASSA users or a computer-to-
computer interface using XML HTTP post. 
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d.  Testbed 
The SASSA Test Bed Segment refers to the SASSA test bed, which 
provides support prior to and after launch. The SASSA Test Bed, prior to launch, 
provides support to SASSA hardware and software development throughout the initial 
assembly level, unit level and system level design verification and acceptance test phases 
of the program.  During this phase, the SASSA integration test bed provides a platform 
for both integration and test as well as verification and validation tasks.  End-to-end 
testing is performed which includes instrument stimulation between SASSA and a host 
spacecraft computer simulator.  Built in to the Test Bed is the capability to conduct end-
to-end performance testing of the integrated SASSA space segment.  After launch, the 
Test Bed provides the capability to aid with the anomaly resolution processes of on-orbit 
hardware. It may also be used for technology insertion evaluation of new and 
developmental threat warning sensors (instruments) and their compatibility with the 
SASSA system.   
4.  Program Summary and Current Status 
The SASSA program received Authority to Proceed (ATP) in October of 2007, 
and held kick off meetings shortly after.  Since ATP SASSA has conducted a Systems 
Requirements Review (SRR), Integrated Baseline Review (IBR), System Software 
Review (SSR), Interim Design Review (IDR), and Critical Design Review (CDR). In 
addition, it has also conducted an independent program assessment (IPA) at the 
suggestion of the SMC commander as well as a GAO audit.  SASSA was a dual award 
contract and ran identical, simultaneous programs from ATP through IDR.  The SASSA 
program achieved every milestone on schedule through CDR for the first contractor. The 
second contractor held all milestones on time except SRR, which was delayed by one 
month. The second contractor was terminated prior to IDR in order to retain funding 
obligations incurred when commitments were solidified with the first host satellite 
program.  
The SASSA program currently has firm relationships with two separate satellites 
program organizations and plans to operate two complete SASSA systems. SASSA 
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currently is maintaining its 24-month goal of delivering a complete baseline system 
including flight-qualified hardware. The baseline system is defined as a complete space 
segment, a ground segment, a Test Bed, and one set of EDU units of the CIU and RWR. 
The baseline system defines a basic flexible capability ready to be adapted to specific 
program needs.  Deliveries planned in December 2010 and January 2011 will contain the 
SASSA baseline with specifically configured space and ground segments for each host. 
Delta CDR activities, to assess the maturity of the specific modifications needed to fly 
with each host, are planned to be held in the fall of 2010.  
Leading up to the winter deliveries, the SASSA program has completed 
significant amounts of material to date. Two complete EDU space segments have been 
built with their respective unit software. Two complete ground segments and two 
complete test beds have also been completed. The first CIU flight unit is close to 
completion and starting unit test. The RWR flight unit is over 80% complete. The 
remainder of the fall will be spent completing environmental test and verification of 
system requirements. This will conclude the final build of space and ground software and 
as well as the completion and test of host specific modifications to the two units.  
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III.  STANDARD SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
DISCUSSION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
As the need for more refined systems and machines pressed the military over the 
last half century, the practices and standards across many disciplines for program 
management and engineering for acquiring these systems have been captured, defined 
and iterated. These standards at the industry, DoD and military branch levels for 
acquisitions attempt to define a standard roadmap for all military acquisitions for the 
purposes of producing the most effective product at the most reasonable cost. Refinement 
of these standards over time and innovation are critical to the continued success and 
optimization of effective systems for our modern military.   
B.  GENERAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
The discipline and specialization of systems engineering has firmly held one leg 
in the program management world and one in technical engineering. It has been an 
essential contributor to effective technical design process and to successful program 
management. Like broader acquisition guidance for specific engineering disciplines, 
systems engineering has also followed the path of formalizing its standards and processes 
to allow formal review and improvement. It is the review and improvement of these 
standards over a variety of program types that truly lends to the strength and adequacy of 
the standards by which our national assets are designed and fielded.  
Attaining a concisely articulated working definition for systems engineering can 
prove to be difficult.  Given the emphasis on standard guidance for systems engineering 
in this study, an adequate contextual, working definition of SE can be obtained by 
referring directly to the sources used for the study. Standard definitions of systems 
engineering are surveyed below and include: 
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DoD 5000.02: “Systems engineering provides the integrating technical 
processes to define and balance system performance, cost, schedule, and 
risk within a family-of-systems and systems-of-systems context.” (p. 77) 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG): “Systems engineering is an 
interdisciplinary approach encompassing the entire technical effort to 
evolve and verify an integrated and total life cycle balanced set of system, 
people, and process solutions that satisfy customer needs. Systems 
engineering is the integrating mechanism across the technical efforts 
related to the development, manufacturing, verification, deployment, 
operations, support, disposal of, and user training for systems and their life 
cycle processes. Systems engineering develops technical information to 
support the program management decision-making process.”(Adopted for 
DoD and derived from EIA/IS 632, DAG p. 159)  
INCOSE SE Handbook: “Systems engineering is a perspective, a process, 
and a profession, as illustrated by these three representative definitions: 
1) Systems engineering is a discipline that concentrates on the design and 
application of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves 
looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facets and 
all the variables and relating the social to the technical aspect. (Ramo1) 2) 
Systems engineering is an iterative process of top-down synthesis, 
development, and operation of a real-world system that satisfies, in a near 
optimal manner, the full range of requirements for the system. (Eisner2) 
3) Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to 
enable the realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining 
customer needs and required functionality early in the development cycle, 
documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem: operations, 
cost and schedule, performance, training and support, test, manufacturing, 
and disposal. SE considers both the business and the technical needs of all 
customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user 
needs. (INCOSE3)” (sec 2.2, p. 7) 
Mil STD 499B:“An interdisciplinary approach encompassing the entire 
technical effort to evolve and verify an integrated and life-cycle balanced 
set of system people, product, and process solutions that satisfy customer 
needs. Systems engineering encompasses: 
a. the technical efforts related to the development, manufacturing, 
verification, deployment, operations, support, disposal of, and user 
training for, system products and processes; 
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b. the definition and management of the system configuration; 
c. the translation of the system definition into work breakdown structures; 
and 
d. development of information for management decision making.” 
(Appendix A, p. 40) 
Aerospace Corporation Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook 
TOR: “The goal of space vehicle SE is to ensure that a desired system is 
designed, built, and operated so that the system accomplishes its mission 
in the most cost-effective manner possible, considering performance, cost, 
and schedule risk.” (SV SE – 1.1, p. 1) “System level SE is a process used 
to develop requirements and to integrate the technical efforts across a 
program.” (2.2, p.17) “The essence of successful system engineering is to 
get all of the elements of a system integrated and working properly.” 
(4.3.1., p. 69).  
IEEE Std 1220-2005(ISO/IEC 26702): “The SEP is a generic problem-
solving process that provides the mechanisms for identifying and evolving 
the product and process definitions of a system.” (here, SEP is systems 
engineering process) (4.1, p. 12)  
In summary, systems engineering provides the discipline in any acquisition 
program that works to understand clearly the motivating cause for the acquisitions, and 
then seeks to systematically achieve that end through the rigorous and consistent use of 
processes. In the most basic sense, SE attempts to be the guarantee that what is wanted is 
what is achieved. Or, as the SMC primer states, “SE is first and foremost responsible for 
ensuring that the ‘right system’ is developed to meet the customer’s needs,” while 
ensuring “that the ultimate system is ‘developed right.’” (chapter 1, p. 38)  
C.  SPACE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES   
Thus far, systems engineering has been addressed only in conceptual terms 
seeking a solid contextual working definition for this study. However, this study focuses 
on a particular field of Military and DoD acquisitions—that of space systems and SE with 
in this field. The Space and Missiles System (SMC) Systems Engineering Primer is a 
helpful guide in describing unique aspects for space systems and SE within this context:  
 
 20
A satellite system is typically made up of one or more satellites (or space 
vehicles), terrestrial satellite control, and maintain elements, and user 
elements that permit the operational military forces to take advantage of 
the capabilities of the space system. Each satellite is made up of its 
elements, typically the payload (that provides the basic mission capability 
such as communications, surveillance, navigation, etc.) and the spacecraft 
or bus (that typically supports the payload by providing electrical power, 
thermal control, and attitude control, etc.). The payload and bus are, of 
course, subdivided into lower tier elements such as processors, sensors, 
communications (radios), and clocks which are in turn made up of parts 
(such as integrated circuits, relays, or roller bearings) and materials (such 
as metallic or composite structures), all fabricated and assembled using 
various processes. Similarly, a launch system is typically made up of the 
launch vehicles (which provide the initial boost toward orbit), upper or 
transfer orbit stages (which place the satellite in or near its operational 
orbit), ground control and monitoring systems, and facilities used for 
checking out, mating, and supporting the launch vehicles, upper stages, 
and satellites prior to launch. Each launch vehicle may be made up of 
multiple launch stages. Each launch stage and upper stage is typically 
made up of propulsion, guidance and control, and environmental 
protection elements. The distinction between launch systems and satellite 
systems is not always clear such as the case of the Space Shuttle which is 
a launch system that can also perform or support operations on orbit or the 
case of integral upper stages which are supplied as part of the satellite 
system to complete part or all of the transfer orbit function. (p. 2) 
In addition to understanding terminology and what a space system consists of, it is 
also critical to understand the unique elements of designing satellites and vehicles for 
space in the SE process. The SMC SE primer highlights three main differences 1) the 
space environment, 2) unattended operation, and 3) the ultimate high ground.  The space 
environment includes making design accommodation to operate in total vacuum, extreme 
temperature swings and ranges, operating in and through highly charged particles, as well 
as surviving “high vibration, acoustic, shock, and other environments during launch and 
deployment into the operational orbit.” (p. 3).  
The second unique element is that, with the exception of the space shuttle and 
space station, all other space systems operate unmanned. This adds an additional 
complication for maintenance and problem resolution.  As a result, space systems take 
advantage of redundant systems or reloadable software, highly reliable parts, added 
margin to performance and operational capability. The primer states, “Experience shows 
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that the cost of these steps together with the cost of space launch is perhaps ten times or 
more the cost of comparable hardware deployed in terrestrial applications.”(p. 3) This 
extreme premium on space hardware cost puts added pressure and importance on system 
trades “balancing the operational capability to be provided with other factors such as cost, 
reliability, and service life.” (p. 3)   
The final unique aspect of space is the concept of it being the final high ground. 
Conceptually, space provides the ultimate tactical and strategic advantage to arrayed 
military forces. As such, it is expected to and has the responsibility of interfacing a 
multitude of platforms. The SMC primer states: 
The user equipment for such systems can become deployed on a wide 
range of platforms and therefore rival or even exceed the cost of the 
satellites and launch vehicles so that the systems engineering task of 
balancing effectiveness and cost can be still more demanding and 
important. (p. 3)  
The key point in this summary is that an increased emphasis and importance on wide 
system boundaries makes SE on space systems a complicated endeavor.  
D.  SYSTEMS ENGINEERING GUIDANCE CATEGORIES 
In the evaluation of standard SE guidance sources, a distinction can be made, 
which separates SE guidance into two broad categories. The first category will be called 
SE processes. This category contains the day-to-day practical aspects of the SE process 
which systems engineers do as a part of the SE process “on the job.” This contains both 
tasks, which are accomplished in more or less a serial fashion (assuming iterations) as 
well as those SE processes that occur throughout the SE process life cycle. These include 
serial tasks and processes such as defining customer needs, requirements analysis, 
functional decomposition, as well as processes like configuration management and risk 
management, which occur throughout the SE process. The second broad category of SE 
guidance is that which will be called SE technical management processes. This category 
of processes is more specific to military acquisitions and sits in the realm between 
program management and systems engineering. This contains guidance such as 
implementing SE plans (SEM, SEMP) and the use of integrated product teams as an 
organizational structure. DoD 5000.02, the DAG, the SV SE handbook, the SMC SE 
primer, and others all contain SE guidance for these types of technical management 
processes. The SASSA program tailored standard SE guidance from both categories in 
order to more successfully achieve a rapid space acquisition. Table 2 enumerates the 





































Table 2.   Systems Engineering Processes for Acquisitions  
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E.  BODY OF AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES FOR SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING 
This thesis sets out to, first, highlight a tailoring from accepted standard systems 
engineering processes and, second, to assess the relative merit and success of the tailoring 
towards the intended goal.  The goal in this program is achieving a rapid acquisition of a 
satellite payload. In order to achieve the first objective, a standard from which to judge 
the deviation must be adopted and defined.  Since the field of systems engineering is 
diverse, and its processes can be applied to programs of all sizes and objectives, it can be 
difficult to establish this “baseline” set of processes from which to draw distinction.  This 
thesis will achieve this objective by defining a body of texts as relevant authoritative 
source material that are available to government and military organizations. For the 
purposes of this study, this body of material will provide the objective standard of SE 
processes from which distinctions will be drawn. 
The set of material, which constitutes the relevant authoritative sources for this 
thesis, is found in Table 3. 
  
Industry SE Standards
1. The  International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Systems Engineering    
Handbook, v. 3.2, INCOSE‐TP‐2003‐002‐03.2, Jan 2010
2. ANSI/GEIA EIA-632, Processes for Engineering a System, 01 Sept 2003 
3. EIA/IS 731.1, Systems Engineering Capability Model, Electronic Industries Alliance (Interim 
Standard), 01 Aug 2002
4. IEEE 1220-2005, IEEE Standard for Application and Management of the Systems 
Engineering Process, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 09 Sept 2005 
5. ISO/IEC 19760:2003 - A Guide for the Application of ISO/IEC 15288
DoD Acquisition Standards (with SE direction) 
6. Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) Feb 19 2010, chapter 4
7. Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 5000.01 Nov 20 2007
8. Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5000.02 Dec 8 2008, Enclosure 12
9. Military Standard 499B May 6 1994
Space Acquisitions SE Standards 
10. The Aerospace Corporation  TOR-2006(8506)-4494, Space Vehicle Systems Engineering 
Handbook 31 Jan 2006
11. The SMC Systems Engineering Primer & Handbook, 3rd Ed, 29 Apr 2005  
Table 3.   Systems Engineering Guidance Sources 
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This set of sources was chosen for its ability to cover a broad range of application, 
for its ability to represent the view of the only professional SE accrediting organization, 
and for its ability to apply directly to the specific field of space acquisitions (including 
guidance from the center in which the SASSA acquisition was performed in, SMC). 
 
Figure 2.   Relationship of Systems Engineering Guidance Sources 
F.  SUMMARY 
The importance of standard guidelines for DoD acquisitions cannot be understated 
for maintaining efficient acquisition while producing quality products. A major 
undergirding of this guidance is the discipline of systems engineering. It is essential to 
maintaining our present military capability to produce acquisitions that replace, 
supplement, and advance our technological capability in securing and defending the 
freedoms this nation has. The process of applying these standards, tailoring them for 
varying acquisition needs, evaluating the results, and then capturing them to pass on to 
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future programs, is an essential aspect to keeping our guidance up to date and relevant as 
acquisition philosophy changes over time. This chapter has created a context from which 
to evaluate the specific discipline of systems engineering. Specifically it has introduced 
the unique aspects of systems engineering for space systems. It has defined a reference 
set of material that defines standard SE practices for the purpose of this study. This in 
turn allows an evaluation of specific tailoring implementations.  
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IV.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF APPLICABLE STANDARD 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  SASSA Motivation for Tailoring Standard Systems Engineering 
Processes 
The SASSA government program office accepted a difficult challenge upon 
contract award on October of 2008: deliver hardware ready for a space flight 
demonstration in 24 months. By comparison, it is typical to expect major acquisitions to 
range over three to seven years for complete space and ground systems. Smaller unit 
development or technology maturation projects often take at least 18 months and often 
are 24–36 months for flight ready hardware and software. In a surprising contrast, the 
SASSA program set out to deliver two complete systems, space and ground, in 24 
months.  
It was this challenging development timeline that drove the SASSA team to 
seriously challenge the status quo of SE practices and seek optimization. For the elements 
the program office had the ability to change, the SASSA team adopted a key paradigm: 
Executing standard process in a manner that is typically done on larger/longer space 
acquisition programs was not going to achieve success for the SASSA program. This 
paradigm manifested in a variety of ways including process optimization while 
maintaining SE discipline and rigor; focusing on substance and not simply 
process/format; executing processes that add value in the context of program objectives; 
relying upon the expertise of program individuals, as opposed to process; and looking for 
ways to efficiently execute/tailor SE processes. Therefore, it was incumbent on the 
SASSA program to determine the best changes in the execution of the program office and 
systems engineering elements. This fundamental view of space acquisitions, adopted by 
the SASSA program office team, was the cornerstone for modifying standard SE 
guidance.  
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2.  Guidance for Tailoring from Standard Systems Engineering Sources 
Most, if not all, of the authoritative SE sources address the topic of tailoring. 
Presumably, this tailoring is meant to keep the guidance being presented usable across a 
variety of types and sizes of programs. System engineers and program managers are 
called to constantly evaluate, modify, and adapt guidance to accomplish the overall 
goal—that of delivering the best system for the requirements on schedule and on cost.  
Considering the source material directly aides in understanding the full intent for 
tailoring standard SE guidance. Chapter 8 of the INCOSE SE handbook states, 
“Oppressive overhead, with no visible value added contributions, is demoralizing, and 
may result in a system that costs more than it is worth.” (p. 301). INCOSE also provides a 
notional (by their description) diagram aimed at visualizing the balance between too 
much and too little formality in SE. This formality refers here to the rigid application of 
standard guidance versus adapting guidance to different programs. Figure 3 displays 
Figure 8-1 from the INCOSE SE Handbook. The handbook goes on to explain saying: 
The principle behind tailoring is to establish an acceptable amount of 
process overhead committed to activities not otherwise directly related to 
the creation of the system. Tailoring scales the rigorous application of SE 
processes to an appropriate level based on need and the system life-cycle 
stage. (p. 301).   
The Aerospace Corporations SV SE Handbook states similar content about how 
the SE processes “must be tailored to each specific program to reflect the scope, 
requirements, complexity, and phase of the program. Tailoring will define the scope of 
the SE process and the effort to be expended.” (SV SE,  p. 20).  DoD instruction 5000.01 
sec 4.3.1. defines tailoring in its description of “flexibility” with  
There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to 
accomplish the objective of the Defense Acquisition System. MDAs and 
PMs shall tailor program strategies and oversight, including 
documentation of program information, acquisition phases, the timing and 
scope of decision reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular 
conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations 
and the time-sensitivity of the capability need. (p. 3)   
 
  
Figure 3.    Tailoring SE Processes (INCOSE SE Handbook Figure 8-1)  
It expands the thought in sec 4.3.3. with the description of “innovation” by 
saying:  
Throughout the Department of Defense, acquisition professionals shall 
continuously develop and implement initiatives to streamline and improve 
the Defense Acquisition System. MDAs and PMs shall examine and, as 
appropriate, adopt innovative practices (including best commercial 
practices and electronic business solutions) that reduce cycle time and 
cost, and encourage teamwork. (p. 3)  
The DAG corroborates by saying,  
Although the system is based on centralized policies and principles, it 
allows for decentralized and streamlined execution of acquisition 
activities. This approach provides flexibility and encourages innovation, 
while maintaining strict emphasis on discipline and accountability. (p. 6) 
These authoritative sources discuss the importance and necessity of tailoring SE 
processes for specific program with strong, philosophical statements. However, none of 
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the guidance provides direction for practical implementation with criteria to use for 
tailoring. This leaves the SE community to rely on experience and judgment in 
determining the best way to tailor the standards.   
3.  Standard Systems Engineering Processes Chosen for Tailoring on 
SASSA 
Upon the completion of source selection, the SASSA government team took time 
to reflect upon how best to execute the SASSA program. In this discussion various 
aspects of conventional program management and SE were highlighted and decisions 
were made as to how to best balance the needed SE rigor needed while enabling a rapid 
space acquisition. In a series of meetings it was decided which SE processes would be 
followed, which tailored, and which were not feasible to implement due to the program 
cost, timeline, resources or nature of the 24-month technology development program.  
Of the larger set of processes listed in Table 2 in Chapter III D, six were chosen to 
be tailored for the SASSA program. Two of these six are SE processes and four are SE 
technical management processes (per the discussion in section III D). These processes 
were perceived at the time as being good candidates for tailoring to enable more efficient 
processes in achieving the SASSA rapid space acquisition. Table 4 lists these six 
processes, which were tailored for SASSA. Tables 5–7 list the standard SE processes 
from the authoritative SE guidance sources and identify how the SASSA program 
approached each process in following it, modifying it, or not implementing it. Chapter V 
assesses the tailoring for each of these six processes as implemented in the SASSA 
program for effectiveness in executing a rapid space acquisition.  
SASSA Tailored SE Processes SASSA Tailored SE Technical Management Guidance
1. Requirements Development 3. Standard SE Plans
2. Functional Architecture & Design Synthesis 4. SE Leads
5. Technical Reviews
6. IPT Team Structures  





I 1. Configuration Management #1 6. Trade Studies
I 2. Quality and Mission success management I 7. Modeling / Simulation
#1 3. Requirements Management # 1, 2
8. SE tools / strategies application (i.e. Func 
Block Diag, Black Box, Func Flow Diag ) 
I 4. Risk Management and analysis X 9. Weighted decision making processes
X 5. Specialty Engineering utilization and management
# - SASSA Tailored Process ; I - Implemented Standard Process ; X - Utilized Development Contractor's Process
Parallel or Companion Processes Throughout SE
 






1. Elicit customer desires/ needs 4. Design Synthesis
a. Interface and boundary identification  (physical, logical, functional) a. Create sequential build & test plan
b. Functionality identification and functional architecture development b. Detailed interface management
c. Concept Refinement 5. Design Implementation
    d. System architecture creation and representation a. Hardware fabrication
e. Solution exploration and identification b. Software Coding
f. Alternate System Concepts and Elements Definition c. Technical data generation
g. Design Constraints Definition and Refinement 6. Analysis and Assessment
2. Requirements and Constraints Capture / Definition Analysis       a. System optimization
a. Performance Requirements  b. Statistical analysis
b. Defining effectiveness measures       c. Reliability analysis
3. Allocation and Decomposition  d. Missions and Environments
a. Traceability I 7. Verification and Validation of Requirements
b. Functional and Performance determination X 8. Transition
c. Derived requirement generation X 9. Operation Process 
d. Hardware / Software allocation X 10. Maintenance Process 
e. System element allocation X 11. Disposal Process
I
Serial SE Processes (with iteration)
# - SASSA Tailored Process ; I - Implemented Standard Process ; X - Utilized Development Contractor's Process











# 3 1. Use of SEM/SEMP/SEMS/SEDS plans # 1 7. Use of KPP/KPA/ TPM
# 6 2. Organizational Structure - IPT utilization I 8. Modular Open Systems Approaches
# 5 4.  Techncial / Capability Reviews I 9. Long Term Data Managemetn strategies
# 4 5. SE leads and Leadership I
10 . Technical / Program Planning (use of WBS, 
IMS, IMP, EVMS) 
I 6. Use of Competition I 11. Program Protection and System Assurance
SE Technical Management Processes
# - SASSA Tailored Process ; I - Implemented Standard Process ; X - Utilized Development Contractor's Process  
Table 7.   SE Technical Management Processes as Implemented in the SASSA Program 
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B.  SASSA TAILORED STANDARD SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
The following sections describe where the SASSA program applied tailoring and 
modification in six specific system engineering process examples. Each section includes 
a discussion presenting the standard guidance as supported by the authoritative sources. 
This is followed by an explanation of what the SASSA program did to modify the 
standard guidance and what was actually implemented. Each section ends with a 
comparing and contrasting of the standard SE guidance, versus the tailored implemented 
process. The relative success of each tailored process is addressed in Chapter V, Section 
B.  
1.  Requirements Development 
a. Description of Standard Requirements Development  
The process of developing requirements is a fundamental discipline in the 
SE process. As such, there is a large amount of information available as SE guidance on 
this subject. The description here is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the 
subject, rather to provide an adequate summary description with references to guidance 
documents.   
The SMC SE primer starts describing this process with the capabilities 
that a new system will provide. These new capabilities will come from one of two paths 
(typically): either technology “push” or capability or operational “pull.” The “push” case 
involves a technology which has been developed and which is deemed useful by a 
stakeholder. The technology is judged worthwhile to pursue in greater development and 
implementation into a system for DoD use. For the “pull” case, there is a “top-down” 
operational desire or need for a capability levied. This need by the operational users 
needs to be met, and thus a technology development or acquisition is initiated to address 
the need.  
These “pulled” or “pushed” capabilities and needs subsequently enter 
what is called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process for the Air Force. This is a series of prescribed and controlled process steps that 
major acquisition programs are required to follow. It is noteworthy that even non-major 
programs are recommended to use elements of the JCIDS process.  Figure 4 is from the 
SMC SE primer (p. 7). This provides a summary overview of the JCIDS process.  The 
following paragraphs summarize each step to provide an overview of the JCIDS process. 
Based upon a tremendous amount of system engineering effort, each step in the process 
produces either a trade study or a requirements document. As will be described, the ICD, 
CDD, and CPD are requirements documents with increased levels of system specificity.  
 
 
Figure 4.   JCIDS Process Overview (SMC SE Primer, p. 7) 
The first step is a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, 
Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities and deficiencies analysis. This 
analysis focuses on determining if a change in user methodology, doctrine, policy, or 
some other non-material means is sufficient to address the need. If an adequate solution 
cannot be determined then it is decided that something needs to be built to solve the 
problem. The main focus in this phase is to gate a decision as to whether a material 
change is necessary versus a process or non-material solution is adequate.  
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The second step is to complete an Analysis of Materiel Approaches 
(AMA). This process works to identify all the various means, implementations, and 
system approaches that may be utilized to meet the need or implement the technology. 
For example, “the AMA might focus on the preferred approach between a space-based, 
aircraft, or ship-based approach to provide a surveillance capability but usually would not 
identify the specific system concept to be developed.” (SMC SE Primer, p. 6). It 
effectively creates the set of feasible options at a high level from which a group may 
choose to move forward with a solution or investigate critical technologies.  
The third step is the creation of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). 
This is the formal capturing of the needs that are to be addressed by the acquisition 
activity and subsequent material products. It also captures the rationale for why a material 
solution was needed, as investigated in the DOTMLPF analysis.  
The next step is to perform the Analysis of Alternatives, where the options 
presented in the AMA are evaluated and a recommended approach is decided upon. This 
may be an approach involving a single system in a single military branch or could be as 
expansive as a system of systems relying on multiple acquisition developments run in 
separate military branches of the government.  At this stage, the JCIDS process initiates 
its references to milestones. After the AoA, is Milestone A.   Milestone A has its own 
rigorous process to enter and exit, which can be found in a variety of DoD acquisition 
guidance documents.  
The Capability Development Document (CDD) is the next step. The CDD 
captures the information necessary to develop a proposed program. Milestone B follows 
the completion of the CDD. This CDD builds on the information in the AMA, ICD, and 
AoA performed previously in preparation for Milestone A. At this stage in the JCIDS 
process, an emphasis is made to scope the increment or capability into achievable and 
affordable portions. The current paradigm, from the Defense Acquisition University, is 
“Evolutionary or Incremental Development,” defined as “a desired capability is 




developing several increments, each dependent on available mature technology” 
(Evolutionary Acquisition). The CDD supports the definition of these increments in the 
defining of the program that will execute.  
The Capability Production Document (CPD) is the final step in the JCIDS 
process and supports Milestone C in the acquisition path. The SMC SE Primer describes 
the function of the CPD with “The CPD addresses the production attributes and quantities 
specific to a single increment of an acquisition program.”(p. 42).   
The SMC SE primer highlights how this guidance applies for major 
programs and non-major programs and how both are expected to utilize the various 
elements outlined:  
The JCIDS process just described will usually be applied to major 
programs (those with high projected cost or high-level interest). For non-
major programs, the approach to defining the capability needs may be 
somewhat less formal, but will usually include documentation of the need 
in documents such as the ICD and CDD. (p.7) 
With an overview of the entire JCIDS process in mind, it is beneficial to 
treat in greater detail where requirements development occurs and plays a key role in the 
larger framework. Within and between the CDD and CPD phases the development of 
program requirements start (SMC Primer, p. 42) (i.e., the development of requirements 
from which the space system can be designed, built, tested, and ultimately operated to 
satisfy a mission need). It is at this stage of the requirements development process that 
the JCIDS acquisition process references other industry and DoD standards/guidance 
sources for requirements development since this stage involves a broader process to all 
SE rather than just how the DoD accomplishes their acquisitions.  
ANSI/EIA 632 helps identify the start of this broader requirements 
development process, which is stakeholder involvement. ANSI/EIA 632 requirement #4 
a) states “Identify stakeholders who will have an interest or stake in the outcome of the 
project.” (pp. 10–11). Similarly, Requirement 15 a) and b) state “a) Identify and collect 
other stakeholder requirements that can constrain the system’s end products. b) Identify 
and collect other stakeholder requirements that can constrain development, production, 
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test, deployment/installation, training, support/maintenance, and disposal of system end 
products.” (p. 21). Where ANSI/EIA 632 is an international industry SE process, the 
DAG helps corroborate the expectation of stakeholder involvement within the DoD 
JCIDS process direction. The DAG states,  
The program manager and systems engineer will work with the user to 
establish and refine operational needs, attributes, performance parameters, 
and constraints that flow from JCIDS described capabilities, and then 
ensure that all relevant requirements and design considerations are 
addressed (DAG, 4.2.3.2.1. p. 172)  
To accomplish this stakeholder input and requirements development 
process within the larger JCIDS framework, DoD SE guidance recommends using the 
DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). This framework utilizes Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) and Key System Attributes (KSA) concepts for eliciting stakeholder 
needs and desires. The DoDAF defines a common approach for DoD architecture 
description development, presentation, and integration for both war fighting operations 
and business operations and processes (DAG 4.2.3.2.1. p. 199). KPPs and KSAs may be 
policy mandatory requirements pushed down by the military chain of command such as 
“Net Ready” or “Sustainment,” or may be just the capturing and articulating of end 
metrics, which help focus the program on a desired outcome. ANSI/ EIA 632 supports 
this in Requirement 5 f) stating “Identify technical performance measures that will be 
used to determine the success of the system, or portion thereof, and that will receive 
management focus and be tracked using Technical Performance Measurement (TPM) 
procedures.” (p. 12). A more detailed definition of the function and purpose of TPMs, 
KPPs, and KPAs is provided in a note by ANSI/EIA 632: 
NOTE—A TPM program provides an early warning of the adequacy of a 
design in terms of satisfying selected critical performance parameter 
requirements of a system end product. TPM also examines marginal cost 
benefit of performance in excess of requirements. A critical performance 
parameter is one that characterizes a significant total system qualifier. In 
addition, it must be possible to project the evolution of the parameter as a 
function of time toward the desired value at the completion of 
development. The projection can be based on verification, validation, 
planning, or historical data. (p. 12)  
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The completion of this often-lengthy requirements process for the 
government is the creation of the Technical Requirements Document (TRD). The KPPs, 
KPAs and other stakeholder inputs are captured in formal program requirements in the 
TRD. This TRD forms the system requirements basis for DoD solicitation for 
procurement. Based upon the TRD, the development contractor usually creates the 
System Specification. The Technical Requirements Documents (TRD) and the System 
Specification are the two documents that capture the total requirements for a program 
(SMC SE Primer p. 7; SV SE Handbook, p. 657). The system specification then forms 
the basis for the System Requirements Review (SRR) where all parties and stakeholders 
concur that an accurate understanding of the program requirements has been captured in 
the system specification. The validation of the System Specification and thus the TRD for 
a program should satisfy the KPPs and KPAs for the specific increment defined by the 
CDD and CPD. The measured ability to satisfy these high-level documents allows the 
next increment to be initiated in the overall JCID’s process.  
b.  SASSA Tailored Requirements Development as Implemented 
To fully understand how the SASSA program completed requirements 
development the acquisition source of the SASSA program should be considered. The 
SASSA program was initiated by Congress assigning funding to demonstrate a concept 
for providing Space Situational Awareness (SSA) threat warning capability on a satellite. 
In order to accomplish this quickly, the JCID’s process was not used. At this stage, there 
were no major stakeholders, only a defined desire for an increased technological 
application. Those on the SASSA team took their knowledge of SSA current issues, 
previous programs, and long-term planning roadmaps as inputs to the shaping of the 
program. The only input at the start of the program was the wording provided in the Air 
Force unfunded request to Congress: 
The recent test (01/11/07) of the Chinese anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) 
demonstrated the most visible aspects of the growing counterspace efforts 
around the world which would exploit the heavy U.S. dependence on 
space assets and services. SASSA provides the sensing capability for 
current and future space high-value assets to detect and attribute 
interference or attacks. These capabilities are crucial to enabling a full 
range of U.S. responses, from diplomatic to military, in the event of 
hostile action against our spacecraft. (FY08 Air Force Unfunded Request 
Language, Courtesy of SAF/USA) 
Without formal stakeholder requirements, and short timeline, the SASSA 
program had to decide how to generate requirements. The SASSA team attempted to 
focus the technology demonstrator objectives on key near-term enabling technologies. 
Thus, in lieu of actual stakeholder inputs, the SASSA team generated the closest it could 
approximate given the larger SSA picture and incorporating that into what could be done 
within the SASSA rapid space acquisition timeframe.  
The next step in the SASSA TRD requirements-generation process was to 
create a set of program functional objectives (Table 8, TRD 2008) that would focus the 
technology demonstration and synthesize all the data that the SASSA team had analyzed 
regarding mission needs, operational utility, constraints imposed by existing and future 
satellite systems, as well as current technology state. Following the creation of the 
program functional objectives, the government then created the technical requirements 
document (TRD) for the SASSA program. The SASSA team ensured that each TRD 
requirement could be traced back to at least one of the eight functional program 
objectives. This was viewed as essential to show how the program developed 
progressively from its core objectives.  
 
Interface with multiple common spacecraft busses 
- Use standard and common interfaces (hardware, electrical, data)
Accept integration of multiple dissimilar instruments 
- Use standard and common interfaces (hardware, electrical, data)
R3 Use a modular and scalable software architecture
R4 Build/modify and integrate multiple high TRL threat warning instruments
R5 Output sensor information in an easily accessible format
R6 Meet the Minotaur & EELV launch Vehicle families
R7 Build a test bed to verify interface compatibility and functionality through end-to-end testing
R8 Integrate an independent communication capability
R1
R2
Program Functional Objectives 
 
Table 8.   SASSA Functional Objectives 
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The final phase in the SASSA requirements development was the 
transition of the government TRD requirements into the contractor system specification 
and sub-level specifications. This was accomplished once the government obtained a 
SASSA development contractor.  The SASSA contractor developed a draft system 
specification that provided a working basis for the System Requirements Review (SRR). 
At this review, each TRD and system-level requirement in the system specification was 
discussed in detail for understanding. Each requirement’s adequateness and 
appropriateness was assessed.  
In the requirements development process of the SASSA program there 
were a few conscientious decisions made to enable greater efficiency in achieving 
success in the rapid acquisition. These were first, the use of a minimal set of functional 
technical requirements in the TRD (which defined the core SASSA capabilities required); 
second, the use of an Excel-based traceability tool; and third, the development of a 
SASSA interface control document.    
The SASSA government team attempted to address multiple issues in 
creating a minimal functional TRD. The first was that the program simply did not have 
large amounts of time to engage in a TRD process that similar or larger programs in SMC 
would go through. Capturing the essential elements in performance and function in as 
few requirements as possible was thought to streamline this process. A minimum number 
of requirements also gave SASSA the advantage of less overall overhead in dealing with 
requirements management. By SASSA consolidating the number of requirements down 
to a minimum, it also enabled the contractor maximum room for implementation, which 
was a good best practice for SE in problem solving. This was thought to enable the 
maximum amount of flexibility in the implementation of the system as well, which was 
in line with the overall objectives of the SASSA system.  The result was a SASSA TRD 
with just over 40 requirements (TRD, 2008).  
Another implementation the SASSA team utilized was that of a 
traceability matrix in Microsoft Excel. The SASSA program put a significant emphasis in 
the SE activity of requirements decomposition, flow-down, and traceability processes. 
The standard software, called Distributed Object Oriented Requirements System 
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(DOORS) (Babcock, 2009), presented hurdles in efficiency, which the SASSA team 
sought to overcome. Namely, these were portability, user friendliness, and ability to have 
an end-to-end perspective of the requirements across the system. (It must be noted that 
the SASSA development contractor used DOORS to perform their requirements 
management; they tended to utilize the Microsoft Excel product produced from the 
DOORS database in working situations.) 
The solution for SASSA was a single spreadsheet using a combination of 
rows and columns in hierarchical order to capture requirement numbers and requirement 
text, and how that requirement was decomposed and allocated to subsequent 
specifications. Figure 5 shows an example. Each government input document (e.g., SOO, 
SOW, TRD, CONOP) is allocated a section of rows with a break between documents. 
Each document’s section lists its input requirements in successive rows listing the 
requirement number and language, as labeled in columns above these sections. Following 
each requirement in the next row down and in the adjacent column was the decomposed 
requirements in the next set of documents in succession. The order started with 
government input documents, then the System Specification, Segment Specifications, 
Unit Specifications and finally SRSs. Each subsequent column relates the requirements 
created (derived) as a result of the higher parent requirement in the earlier row and 
column. The resulting matrix, albeit large, allows a reader to work in detail, requirement 
by requirement, to see how a particular requirement is being decomposed and addressed 
through lower-level derived requirements. The use of this matrix was expanded to 
capture performance values of certain requirements as well as verification information 
such as type of test, the location of the test in manufacturing and assembly, and the 










Sys Spec Requirement Text Segment Spec 
Requirement ID
1010
SASSA shall have two instruments:  
Instrument One is the Radar Warning 
Receiver (RWR); Instrument Two is the 
Dedicated Stand-alone Communication 
(DSC) system.
SS_21
SASSA shall have two instruments:  
Instrument One is the Radar Warning 
Receiver (RWR); Instrument Two is the 




SASSA shall be available 80% of the 
experimental period after the flight system 
completes on orbit checkout.
SS_4
The CIU shall perform Power-Up Built 
In Test (PBIT).
SS_7
Each powered instrument shall perform 
PBIT.
SS_8
Each instrument shall report PBIT 
results to the CIU
SP_174
SS_95 The SASSA system shall be capable of 
withstanding exposure to any 
combination of the Table 3-3, 
"Transportation and Handling 
Environments”, including transportation 




Figure 5.   Example of SASSA Excel Traceability Spreadsheet 
In its final form, the matrix allowed a user to look at a single requirement 
and assess its completeness of decomposition across the specifications of the program to 
the resulting design elements: how each requirement was assessed in meeting the 
performance aspects of the requirement, and how and where the requirement was going 
to be verified in the testing phase of the program. The fact that the matrix is in Microsoft 
Excel means that it is easily manipulated in software that is almost universally available 
on all computer systems. Having the actual language of all the requirements in a traceable 
chain, and having all the requirements easily identifiable and filterable, makes the matrix 
exceptionally useful and easy to navigate.  This became a great asset for thorough review 
and efficiency in performing rigorous SE on the program.  
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Another unique SASSA program requirements development activity was 
the development of the SASSA three-volume set of interface control documents called 
the Standard Interface Specifications (SIS). These were developed by the SASSA 
program in looking forward to activity beyond the technology demonstration. 
Specifically they were developed with a goal for follow-on activity in future 
instantiations of SASSA programs as well as a method to capture lessons learned on the 
SASSA program. The SASSA program conceived that for SASSA to be effective into the 
future that two items needed to be addressed. The first was that the variety of threat 
warning instruments needed to be expanded to be effective. The second was that host 
satellite organizations needed to know what to expect if the SASSA concept was really to 
be proliferated. The SIS volumes were conceived and written to address these needs.  
SIS Volume I is written for the instrument provider who is interested in 
building a SASSA compatible instrument. Recall an “instrument” is any device that 
enables threat warning. This was coined to get out of the trap of thinking that threat 
warning is simply about having a sensor or sensors. The instrument concept includes 
threat-warning sensors, but allows for capability enhancers or force multiplying enabling 
technologies to be included. This includes, for example, concepts like a battery backup in 
case primary bus power is lost. SIS volume one was written to be a “one-stop-shop” for 
the instrument vendor who wanted to get into the threat warning instrument field and 
become a SASSA compatible instrument. SIS volumes II and III are written for the host 
satellite programs. Volume II describes the interfaces between the SASSA CIU and the 
host space vehicle. Volume III describes the interface between the SASSA ground 
segment and the host ground.  The combined set was an attempt at first exposure to an 
organization that either was interested in having a SASSA system or had been directed to 
be compatible with a SASSA system. Each volume discusses the pertinent information 
each respective space and ground system would need to understand about the SASSA 
hardware, software, procedures, and planning methodologies. This could bring the 
organization a considerable way before interacting with the SASSA team directly and 
facilitate much more efficient conversation.  
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c.  Comparison of Standard Systems Engineering Guidance to 
SASSA 
The first and most significant deviation from standard SE guidance was 
that it did not participate in any form of the JCIDS process.  SASSA did not follow this 
guidance to utilize an ICD or a CDD in its requirement generation process.  
The second major deviation was the choice to move forward without 
stakeholder input acquired by standard (JCIDS process) or other means. A plausible 
argument could be posited that SASSA would have had more value if stakeholder inputs 
from the Air Force MAJCOM requirement offices and operational users were garnered 
before moving forward with any type of hardware development. The SASSA team 
considered this. It determined the process of gathering this feedback could easily 
consume the majority of the 24-month timeline for the effort. Therefore, the SASSA team 
chose to move forward with a spaceflight demonstration and utilize as much input as 
could be obtained in the process. Ultimately, the majority of inputs were from those who 
had worked in previous organizations of interest or generated by the SASSA team. 
SASSA decided that flying a technology demonstrator would be more valuable at 
eliciting stakeholder input and involvement than spending the money entirely on 
attempting to garner support and stakeholder buy-in.  
The third aspect where SASSA deviated from standard SE guidance was 
in not identifying particular KPPs, KPAs, or TPMs for the program as recommended. A 
KPP/KPA/TPM is identified as attempting to “provide an early warning of the adequacy 
of a design in terms of satisfying selected critical performance parameter requirements of 
a system end product.” (ANSI/EIA 632, p. 12). This function was not explicitly defined 
for SASSA in the form of KPP/KPA/TPMs, rather SASSA judged each of the TRD 
requirements as tier one or tier two (TRD, 2008). All the tier one requirements were 
deemed to be essential to the success of the SASSA program and were watched closely 
and specifically assessed at every major milestone review. It should be noted that the 




referred to them as TPMs. Despite having the same name, the SASSA TPMs and those 
highlighted as KPPs or KPAs in the standard SE guidance did not accomplish the same 
function.  
2.  Functional Architecture and Design Synthesis  
a. Description of Functional Architecture and Design Synthesis  
The functional architecture and design synthesis process in SE occurs after 
the requirements definition and allocation steps have been completed. The “functional 
architecture” here may refer specifically in the larger DoD acquisition as what is 
developed and utilized in the JCIDs process and in conjunction with the AMA and AOA 
process steps. This phrase may also be used in the more general SE process steps as an 
element of the SE process in moving from specific requirements to design elements. This 
study is referring to the later of these two in this section. 
The SMC SE Primer describes this process in the broader context of the 




Figure 6.   Simplified SE Process (from Figure 13 SMC SE Primer)  
Specifically, The SMC Primer provides working definitions for the 
Functional Architecture and Synthesis steps: 
The functional architecture defines how the functions will operate together 
to perform the system mission(s). Generally, more than one architecture 
can satisfy the requirements. Usually each architecture and its set of 
associated allocated requirements have different cost, schedule, 
performance, and risk implications. (p. 49) 
Synthesis is the process whereby the functional architectures and their 
associated requirements are translated into physical architectures and one 




Figure 7.   Requirements Analysis Process (SMC SE Primer Figure 14)  
These two steps taken together result in the translating of particular 
requirements, represented as needed functions that are grouped logically, into a physical 
design. This is often the aspect of design and engineering that is most often looked 
forward to or jumped into prematurely. If followed rigorously to this point, ideally the SE 
process will have avoided preconceived physical implementations of requirements and 
functional allocations. It is in this stage where design is conceived to meet sets of needed 
functions that in turn are then represented as physical designs. The implementation of this 
design can lead to commercial off the shelf (COTS) usages or identified needs for 
modified, new, or state-of-the-art hardware that does not exist.  
A related and essential aspect of this phase is the identification of the 
internal and external interfaces. Up to this point in the SE process, there will only have 
been requirements and functions identified. As these functions are logically grouped, the 
early identification of interfaces can take shape. The internal interfaces may represent 
interfaces between functions within a particular grouping of functions, or between logical 
groupings of functions. External interfaces are those that are those at the boundaries of 
the system and groupings of functions. As the SE process is advanced, these internal and 
 46
 47
external interfaces take on specific form and detail. These may be functional, procedural 
or have physical aspects such as power, data, or timing signals. The goal of the synthesis 
section in producing an approved design implementation that meets the needed functions 
is to also to have identified all the interfaces, internal and external, and their respective 
detailed information.  
During this functional architecture and design synthesis phase, it is 
recommended that multiple alternatives be carried in parallel. These alternatives 
represent different cost, risk, and performance implementations, and are utilized as a 
method of risk management.  These various implementations allow the program a “back-
up” should the higher-performance (or primary) solution prove infeasible, too costly, or 
require too lengthy of a development schedule (SMC SE Primer, p. 49). As a design trade 
exercise, a program will assess all the alternatives and choose a primary path to be 
developed. The other paths can remain in a less mature state until there are signs that they 
many need to be developed and implemented as a risk reduction strategy.  
b.  SASSA Tailored Functional Architecture Design and Synthesis 
as Implemented 
The SASSA program made certain decisions early in the program 
planning stages, which directly shaped the functional architecture and design synthesis 
phase for the contractor. In the simplest terms, the government office performed early 
stages of the functional architecture and synthesis design process. This resulted in 
requirements for the potential offerors to propose to in the RFP. The steps that the 
government office took were first to translate the congressional language into broad 
objectives. The second phase was to generate various possible design implementations by 
creating reference architectures. This process also served a secondary purpose in aiding 
cost estimation for program budget planning. This trade space of reference architectures 
was generalized into various potential mechanical hardware implementations and then 
converted back into a functional block diagram formats as an attempt to encourage 
creativity to solve the problem but within certain mechanical constraints.  
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The process of generating possible design implementations and creating 
reference architectures occurred in the program after the SASSA program was notified 
that it was likely to receive funding. This task was conducted internal to the Air Force 
SMC Wing organization, and in collaboration with the government personnel and 
contracted support personnel.  This scope of the short analysis of alternative type study 
was to determine the best and most useful combinations of technology demonstrations 
between ground and flight options, and what aspects of the system should be placed in 
priority over others. It also set out to determine what types of sensors to make a priority 
in the SSA threat warning suite since it was likely to be cost constrained.   
This was useful, first, in defining the boundaries of the SASSA system for 
the possible range of solutions. It was also helpful in defining likely interfaces for the 
system. This sense of interfaces and solution boundaries helped determining feasible and 
infeasible architecture solutions for consideration. The less feasible solutions would 
likely require higher levels of technology maturity or development risk. The more 
feasible solutions would require less risk and could be developed more quickly. This 
study also helped identify realistic expectations for technical capability ranges. This 
included sensor capabilities for various threats, realistic views of orbit ranges, and a 
better understanding of the size, weight, and power of such systems in space. This 
combined sense of what was possible with an associated risk provided useful data as a 
context for deciding the best method of program execution and building a feasible plan in 
schedule and budget for meeting the rapid space acquisition.  
The output of this study period was what ultimately led to the modification 
of the design and synthesis SE process for the SASSA program. It was determined that in 
order to achieve the rapid acquisition in the allotted time aspects of the design synthesis 
and SASSA technology demonstrator needed to be constrained.  The end result was a set 
of required segments, a set of required functions specific to each segment, and a set of 
required mechanical hardware unit implementations specific to the space segment.  
A final aspect of SASSA’s implementation of the functional architecture 
design and synthesis process was the decision to utilize high heritage and high technical 
readiness level (TRL) hardware. This included the constraint of NSA type one approved 
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encryption and decryption capability. All units had to have some heritage relationship 
and were required to be at TRL six or above, or to have a government-approved TRL 
maturity plan approved. This decision was made in an effort to meet the rapid 24-month 
schedule with flight ready hardware ready for a space flight demonstration. Overall, this 
constraint limited the total possible solutions, but allowed for lower risk designs that had 
a basis in previous efforts. 
c.  Comparison of Standard Guidance to SASSA 
In this instance the difference between standard SE guidance and what the 
SASSA program implemented is more subjective than previous categories. This has to do 
with where one draws the line between a legitimate constraint in the SE development 
process and a strict interpretation of the Prephase A concept generation phase. If a strict 
interpretation (or more purist SE approach) is taken then there really should be no 
constraints on the system except those strictly necessary to address the needed 
capabilities and functions. This creates an extremely open trade space, which encourages 
creative problem solving with innovative solutions. At some point, legitimate options in 
the trade space in this open style SE approach will be weeded out due to realism being 
added back into the system. Less feasible and unrealistic solutions will then not be 
pursued in the military acquisition—as appealing as those envisioned capabilities may be.  
If this view of SE is adopted and used to judge against what the SASSA 
program implemented, it would have deviated greatly. This would have constrained many 
aspects of the possible design space in the very early phases by interpreting the 
congressional language into reference designs. To be more in line with the SE guidance 
the SASSA program should have left the contractor much more trade space to consider 
design options as long as they could justify that they were meeting the intent of the 
direction and/or higher level objectives decomposed from the congressional language.  
The SASSA program could also be judged against a more liberal 
interpretation of the SE guidance. This view may allow greater constraints to be imposed 
earlier in the SE process, thereby constraining the possible set of feasible designs, 
justified as an aspect of meeting the overall goal of the SE process. In this interpretation, 
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SASSA would not be judged to have deviated greatly. SASSA would be viewed 
compliant for having provided functional requirements and objectives. They may have 
been judged as having deviated from guidance by provided aspects of the design by 
segment or even dictating specific implementations for the CIU, RWR, and DSC 
instruments.  
3. Standard Systems Engineering Plans  
a.  Description of Standard Systems Engineering Plans 
Standard systems engineering plans is the term designated in this study to 
refer to the family of similar documents described in systems engineering guidance, 
which address a standard description of how systems engineering will be accomplished in 
an acquisition. Typically developed in the early stages of an acquisition, it can include all 
of the following: the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), the Systems Engineering 
Management Plan (SEMP), the Systems Engineering Master Schedule (SEMS), and the 
Systems Engineering Detailed Schedule (SEDS).  
MIL-STD-499B section 4.1, titled “Systems Engineering Planning 
Implementation,” provides requirements for the developing of and implementations of 
systems engineering plans stating, “The integrated technical effort shall be reflected in 
the Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP), the Systems Engineering Master 
Schedule (SEMS), and the Systems Engineering Detailed Schedule (SEDS)” (p. 9). It 
goes on to describe how the government should write and provide the SEMP as 
contractual direction where the “performing activity” (i.e., the contractor) should execute, 
maintain, and update the SEMP (p.9). It also describes how the contractor should be 
tasked to develop the Systems Engineering Master Schedule (SEMS), and the Systems 
Engineering Detailed Schedule (SEDS).  
The Space Vehicle SE Handbook provides similar direction in sections 
2.2.2.7 titled “Government Systems Engineering Plan,” and 2.2.2.8. titled “Government 
Development Plan.”  This handbook states, “The purpose of a government SEP (or its 
equivalent) is to organize government teams’ roles, accountabilities, and products.” (p. 
29).  It also addressed other plans by saying that “…it is necessary to have a systems 
engineering master schedule (SEMS) or the equivalent” (p. 9).  
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The Defense Acquisition Guidebook corroborates this direction in section 
4.2.2. stating,  
Best practice is to align the government SEP with the contractor's 
SEP/SEMP/technical plan following contract award and maintain 
alignment and currency. Where practical, these documents should initiate 
a process to unify the program technical planning between government 
and contractor(s) (p. 175).  
It is helpful at this point to understand the general topics and themes 
covered in a SEP and SEMP in order to gain a context for understanding how SASSA’s 
tailored SE processes addressed the same topics or themes. The SEP is the government’s 
systems engineering plan while the SEMP is the contractors system engineering 
management plan.  
Appendix C1 of the SMC SE Primer provides an example SEP outline. A 
sampling of key topics is captured in Table 9.  
 
 Systems Engineering Organization 
 Certification Requirements 
 Configuration Management 
 Systems Safety 
 Systems Engineering Tools 
 Verification and Validation 
 Security 
 Specialty Engineering  
 Resource Allocation 
 Technical Reviews 
 Configuration Management 
 Technical Baseline Management 
 Data Management 
 Interface Management 
 SE and Management Tools 
 Program Integration 
 Contract Management 
 Work Breakdown Structure 
Table 9.   Sample SEP topics 
Appendix C1 of the SMC SE Primer also provides an example SEMP 
outline. A sampling of key topics is captured in Table 10.  
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 Systems Engineering Process 
 Requirements Analysis 
 Functional Analysis and Allocation 
 Synthesis 
 Technical Performance Measurements  
 Technical Reviews and Audits 
 Configuration baselines 
 Systems Engineering Tools 
 Systems Analysis and Control 
 Risk Management 
 Configuration Management 
 Interface Management 
 Data Management 
 Specifications 
 Verification Planning 
Table 10.   Sample SEMP topics 
b.  SASSA Tailored Systems Engineering Plans as Implemented 
The SASSA government team used a series of processes and tools to 
define and determine its SE approach for the SASSA program, as well as its expectations 
for the contractors. The first was technical meetings, discussing the SE approach to be 
used for the government team and what should be required of the contractor. This 
discussion covered various levels of formality and responsibility for boards (e.g., 
configuration management, part selection, failure review, risk management). This 
included discussion of what various SE elements on the program should be under 
governmental control. It was consensus from these discussions that the SASSA team 
moved into the second major process, the preparing of the RFP for the source selection.  
The drafting process for the RFP continued to align and solidify the views 
of the government members as well as capture the consensus in the source-selection 
evaluation criteria. Multiple sections of the evaluation criteria required the contractor to 
provide justification of their SE processes. This provided criteria from which to judge the 
SE capability and processes of the offerors (SASSA contractors). It also solidified the 
government team’s approach and expectations for the contractor for SE processes. A 
beneficial side effect was a configuration-controlled (via source-selection process) 
assessment of each contractor’s SE approach and plan. The government team had the 
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opportunity to evaluate the potential offeror’s responses to these process requirements, 
and ask questions of the contractor—to make sure they clearly understood the ability and 
intent of the contractor in doing SE on the SASSA program.  
The next tool the SASSA team used was the integrated master schedule 
(IMS). This defined for the program major SE functional tasks and phases, as well as 
other required contractual deliveries. The government also used  contractual deliveries in 
the form of Contract Data Item Deliverables, known as CDRLs. Examples of CDRLs 
chosen to aid in understanding the contracts SE process and plans include a government-
approved software development plan (SDP), configuration management plan, and a parts 
management plan (PMP).  
Once the SASSA program was initiated and running, the program utilized 
other processes to augment the SE process already captured. The SASSA program office 
utilized a combination of government-only processes, as well as contractor-led processes. 
The government-led processes included engineering review boards (ERBs), change 
control boards (CCBs), requirement analysis, and approval. These particular processes 
were chosen by the government because they represented key nodes in the SE process at 
the government level.  Issues raised to these process levels needed to be controlled at the 
government level due to their potential for significant shifts in the program requirements, 
design capability, or overall performance.  
The SASSA program also made use of the established contractor corporate 
processes for risk management, trade studies, configuration management (CM), 
requirements allocation and verification, and failure review boards (FRBs). Additionally, 
the contractor proposed the use of their command media SEMP as an already established 
practice. This benefited the program without having to expend time or resources in 
writing one for the SASSA program. These particular processes were chosen because 
they were good candidates to run efficiently at the contractor level. They were already in 
contractor “format” and, as such, were easy and efficient to implement. These processes 
instilled adequate SE process checks at the developer level, without adding significant 
overhead or resource drain to the contractor.    
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Overall, the SASSA program implemented a wide variety of smaller, easy-
to-implement processes that took advantage of the natural progression of the program in 
order to define, communicate, and execute the plan for doing systems engineering. These 
processes utilized a combination of pre-contract award, government-run, and contractor-
run processes, and represented the complete SASSA approach for executing systems 
engineering on this rapid acquisition.  
c.  Comparison of Standard Guidance to SASSA 
The SASSA team did not follow SE guidance for creating a SEP, SEMS, 
and/or SEDS. Rather, the team adapted a series of other tools and processes.  The SASSA 
team decided to try to keep the program as streamlined and efficient as possible, 
minimizing the required overhead to the bare minimum, while still achieving the 
necessary insight for implementing SE on the SASSA program. This “light and lean” 
approach consisted of a variety of individual elements taken as a whole for how SE 
would be implemented on the program.  
These elements consisted of 1) the RFP evaluation criteria for processes 
for systems engineering and software engineering management—this captured in a 
configuration-controlled format—the government’s expectations for SE implementation 
on the SASSA program; 2) the contractor’s proposal response to the RFP for these 
criteria—this articulated the contractor’s process and plan without requiring a standard 
SEMP or similar documentation; 3) the integrated master schedule (IMS)—this captured 
major SE milestones and task phases and their interrelations to other critical events; 4) 
the required contractual deliveries (CDRLs) that are government approved for CM, PMP, 
and the SDP—this provided governmental influence on critical detail elements of SE 
implemented on the program.  
The complete combination of these elements allowed the SASSA team to 
save resources and time for both the government team and contractor teams, while still 
achieving a necessary understanding and agreement for how SE would be implemented 
on the SASSA program.  
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4. Use of Systems Engineering Leads 
a. Description of Systems Engineering Leads From Guidance 
The directed use of systems engineering leads is discussed primarily in the 
Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG), but is also included in DoD 5000.02, which the DAG 
references and then expands on. The major direction from SE guidance is to appoint a 
systems engineering lead for a program. Both DoD 5000.02 and the DAG talk to this 
aspect: 
Each PEO, or equivalent, shall have a lead or chief systems engineer on 
his or her staff responsible to the PEO for the application of systems 
engineering across the PEO's portfolio of programs. The PEO lead or chief 
systems engineer shall: a. Review assigned programs' SEPs and oversee 
their implementation b. Assess the performance of subordinate lead or 
chief systems engineers assigned to individual programs in conjunction 
with the PEO and PM. (5000.02, p.77) 
This technical authority should ensure not only proper systems 
engineering process application to programs but also to proper training, 
qualification and oversight of systems engineering personnel assigned to 
programs. As part of this overall responsibility for technical oversight, the 
technical authority should: Nominate a lead or chief systems engineer to 
the program manager at the initial stages of program formulation. The lead 
or chief systems engineer should be accountable to the program manager 
for meeting program objectives, and accountable to the systems 
engineering technical authority for the proper application of systems 
engineering. (DAG, p. 173)  
Guidance is straightforward in its intent for each program following it to 
assign a systems engineering lead for each program. It is then this individual’s 
responsibility to oversee and ensure the implementation of the proper application of 
systems engineering for meeting the program objectives. According to 5000.02 and the 
DAG, there should be an assigned SE lead for every program.   
b.  SASSA Tailored Systems Engineering Leads as Implemented 
The SE function for the SASSA program was performed as any of the 
other tasks that needed to take place on the SASSA program.  Chapter IV, B 6, will 
discuss this application in light of IPT structures on the SASSA program.  In the interim, 
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it is important to understand that there was no IPT structure on the SASSA government 
program.  SE tasks were assigned/allocated to the individual best able to work the task.  
As a result, SE for the program was done in a team fashion, with individual elements 
being worked by individuals approved and iterated by the consensus of the group. The 
results of the task(s) were presented to the larger team and defacto brought to consensus 
given peer review.  The task lead acted as the issue lead, and the Air Force officer in 
charge approved the final product for the program.  
c.  Comparison of Standard Guidance to SASSA 
The primary deviation from standard SE guidance and the SASSA 
program as implemented was that SASSA did not appoint or use a SE lead for the 
SASSA program. There was no single person assigned the responsibility for ensuing 
what SE processes were followed or ensuring they were accomplished. The SASSA 
program took a simplified approach with a much flatter organizational structure. This 
structure basically had a single lead with a group of people without titles, who all 
participated to make the SASSA program a success. Each program task was delegated a 
lead, which matured the task to a level where the rest of the team could provide feedback. 
The SE for the program followed the same pattern. To date, there is no single SE lead in 
charge of the SE aspect of the government team. This implementation can sound very 
counterproductive towards the goal of accomplishing excellent SE. This indeed is a risk 
for every team adopting this method. However, the SASSA team considered this and 
weighed the abilities of the small team and their ability to work together, and, by mutual 
consent with the approval of the program lead, made the decision to implement the 
approach.   
5. Technical Reviews 
a. Description of Technical Reviews From Guidance 
Technical reviews are major milestones in the life of a program. These are 
typically used as approval gates for forward progress. Technical review milestones most 
often follow the same order and have a prescribed content per standard SE guidance. The 
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SMC SE Primer describes them as “requirements reviews, design reviews, and 
configuration audits” and describes that they: 
Provide an opportunity to assess program status in considerable detail. In 
particular, requirements and design reviews can be essential to monitoring 
at points in the program prior to the availability of test and other 
verification data that provide a direct indication of contract compliance. 
(p. 89).  
The milestones that are commonly part of an acquisition are summarized, in order of 
occurrence, in Table 11, taken from section 1.5 of the Aerospace SV SE handbook, which 



















Standard SE guidance from the SV SE handbook goes on to describe that 
two of these reviews, PDR and CDR, are each not to be conducted as single review rather 
“are a summary of progressive or incremental reviews that start with specific 
configuration items (CI’s), then assemblies or subsystems, and culminate in a system-
level review.” (SV SE Handbook, sec 2.4.1.3, p. 40). This is corroborated by the DAG 
sec 4.3.3.4.2. in saying,  
For complex systems, a CDR may be conducted for each subsystem and 
logistics element. These incremental reviews lead to an overall system 
CDR. Incremental design reviews are usually defined at Interface Control 
Document boundaries. (p. 240)  
Standard SE Guidance provides more direction for technical reviews 
regarding when the program has the technical review, as well as the means by which the 
program judges the criteria and readiness of the program for a particular review. DoD 
instruction 5000.02, in the Technical Reviews section states: 
Technical reviews of program progress shall be event-driven and 
conducted when the system under development meets the review entrance 
criteria as documented in the SEP. They shall include participation by 
subject matter experts who are independent of the program (i.e., peer 
review), unless specifically waived by the SEP approval authority as 
documented in the SEP. (p. 77).  
It is important for this study to highlight three main aspects from this SE 
direction. The first is that technical reviews shall be event driven (as opposed to schedule 
driven) and follow the order set forth in guidance. The second that entrance and exit 
criteria are used and are defined previously in the SEP, or at least identified prior to the 
beginning of the program (ANSI/EIA 632 Req 5 g, p. 12). Thirdly, that there should be 
participation by subject matter experts who are independent of the program.  
The DAG shows its support of these same points by quoting DoD 5000.02 
directly then expanding on the themes in section 4.3 (p. 208). As well as corroborating 
the direction given in DoD 5000.02, the DAG makes an additional recommendation 
regarding technical reviews. Section 4.3 states “To assist in the preparation for and 
conduct of technical reviews technical review risk assessment checklists are available for 
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each of the reviews.” (209). These “checklists” are a recommended approach for defining 
the content of each of the reviews as well as a tool to assess the completeness of the 
review.  
Note: Guidance from the DAG is intended in the context of a major 
program of record (JCIDS). The DAG makes reference to significant lead times 
necessary to prepare for these significant events and how material developed in pre-
acquisition may be needed to be used as inputs in this material (sec 4.3, p. 209). This 
reference is clearly made in the paradigm of a major A, B & C Milestone event type 
program. An assumption was made in applying SE direction for accomplishing a major 
program milestone such as PDR or CDR to a similar event held for a pre-acquisition type 
technology demonstrator like SASSA. It was viewed as applicable in the sense that, when 
a program holds a major event like CDR, there are only a few sources that can be used as 
examples to provide a template for what the event should be like and the content it should 
have, albeit used as a starting place for tailoring. If this type of guidance was not used 
due to its inapplicability, and if taken in the strictest sense, then there would be no 
guidance available for a SASSA-type program’s milestone event.  
b.  SASSA Tailored Technical Reviews as Implemented 
The SASSA program identified its major and minor sets of program 
milestones to be accomplished in the Integrated Master Plan (IMP), as identified in sec 
6.2.5, Attachment CD4 to the SASSA RFP. Milestones are identified as either an Event 
(E) or a Significant Accomplishment (SA). The list of Events is listed in Table 12 and the 
list of Significant Accomplishments is listed in Table 13.  
 
1. SASSA Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) 
2. SASSA System Requirements Review (SRR) 
3. SASSA System Interim Design Review (IDR) 
4. SASSA System Critical Design Review (CDR) 
5. SASSA Pre-ship to SV Host Review 
6. System and Segment On-orbit Test Completion Review 
Table 12.   SASSA Events (SASSA RFP Attachment CD-4, p. 36) 
(NOTE:  The IDR event is very similar to a PDR cited in SE guidance.) 
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1. SASSA Kick-off Meeting 
2. SASSA Testbed Design Review 
3. SASSA Software Specification Review (SSR) 
4. SASSA Testbed Certification (TC) 
5. SASSA AI&T Start 
6. SASSA Mission Readiness Review (MRR) 
7. Support to SV Host Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
8. Support to SV Host Launch Readiness Review (LRR) 
9. Support to SASSA Launch 
Table 13.   SASSA Significant Accomplishments (SASSA RFP Attachment CD-4, p. 36) 
Directly after contract award the SASSA program made a decision on the 
order that the milestones would be conducted. The order that the milestones were 
executed is listed in Table 14 with (E) for Standard Event and (SA) for a Significant 
accomplishment.  
 
1.  SASSA Kick-off Meeting (SA)  
2.  SASSA System Requirements Review (SRR) (E)  
3.  SASSA Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) (E)  
4.  SASSA Software Specification Review (SSR) (SA) 
5.  SASSA System Interim Design Review (IDR) (E)  
6.  SASSA System Critical Design Review (CDR) (E)  
Table 14.   SASSA Milestones Conducted 
After the initial Kick-off meeting with each contractor, the SASSA 
program decided to accomplish the SRR first followed by the IBR, despite the traditional 
reversed order. The next milestone in order following the IBR was the IDR (Interim 
Design Review), which acted as a progress review between SRR and CDR in place of a 
PDR.  
Each of the cited standard SE documents provides guidance on using 
major milestones in order to assess maturity before proceeding to the next major phase of 
an acquisition. SE guidance also directs when and where milestone entry and exit criteria 
should be generated and content checklists for each event. Aside from these examples, 
however, there is no other instruction for the execution of the events. In order to prevent 
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major schedule setbacks due to inadequate maturity at the milestone reviews, it was 
imperative that the correct material be provided and reviewed efficiently. Thus, the 
SASSA program developed a methodology out of this need to emphasize program 
momentum in order to maintain cost and schedule goals for the 24-month delivery.  
The first aspect of the SASSA process was to create and expose the 
contractor to the milestone entry and exit criteria for the event. The SASSA program 
developed its own entry / exit criteria tailored from standard guidance sources such as 
MIL-STD 1540, MIL-STD 499B, and MILSTD 2167.  The government team created 
them prior to each event (8-12 weeks out) and discussed them with the contractor.   The 
next step was to set up a review schedule leading up to the event. A goal for this was to 
provide a means to review the material for content and presentation, judging it against the 
entry criteria for a sufficient level of maturity. The SASSA team decided to require final 
presentation-quality briefing materials and supporting data 30 days prior to the event.  
Once material was received, the SASSA team followed an aggressive 
internal review process designed to assess the quality, clarity, completeness, and maturity 
of the material. A series of iterative cycles occurred where the government team shared 
their findings with the contractor and subsequent corrected material was provided. Figure 
8 depicts this process over the 30-day review cycle.  
Approximately two weeks prior to the event, a meeting was held to 
discuss the readiness of the contractor to conduct the review. This meeting was 
commonly referred to as the “Go/No Go” meeting. If sufficient maturity was achieved 
against the criteria, then the contractor was contacted in the following days to share with 
them the entry criteria grading. If the maturity of the material was insufficient, the 
milestone would be delayed with specific areas to be addressed. The government team 
would work issues in a “shoulder-to-shoulder”-style working meeting in the following 
days.  
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Figure 8.   Example SASSA Milestone Review Schedule 
The end result of this iterative process was a good screening for maturity 
and major issues early. This minimized the possibility that there were major surprises 
discovered at the event, which could cause significant schedule delays. This also left a 
moderate amount of time to work questions and issues prior to the event so that, going 
into the event, the majority of these were resolved. The strategy adopted was to do the 
majority of the work prior to the event so that the event itself could be focused on the 
summary of all the material as a wrap-up and culminating event vice the start of the 
review process. 
At the conclusion of the milestone event, the government team would 
caucus and build an out-brief presentation given on the last day of the meeting. It would 
consist of a recap of the entry criteria grading and would highlight any areas of concern. 
It would then provide a grading against the exit criteria and recap any significant issues 
and action items captured. This presentation would be briefed by the government, 
typically the SASSA program manager, to the program management team of the 
contractor. This extra effort by the government team was extremely well received by the 
contractor. This process provided immediate feedback, which was very rewarding to the 
contractor.  
The milestone event process concluded with “action items” being captured 
from the event and the government team requiring the contractor to provide an action-
item closure plan for each action. Since major issues would have kept the event from 
occurring, these actions were typically not major program or technical issues. 
 63
 64
Occasionally a significant issue would be “discovered” in the course of the event review 
and would need to be adjudicated in short order. When these action item closure plans 
were provided, the government would officially close the event.  
c.  Comparison of Standard Guidance to SASSA 
The first and most apparent deviation the SASSA program took was to 
conduct the System Requirements Review (SRR) as the first major event. A typical order, 
following standard SE direction, a program would hold post Kick-off is IBR. This is 
normally due to the fact that the IBR establishes the “baseline” of resources allocated to 
tasks, schedule, and the overall implementation of the program budget. It is often viewed 
as necessary to accomplish this event before anything else. The SASSA team knew that 
an IBR needed to be conducted quickly. However, given the extremely intense 
development schedule of only 24 months, the most beneficial task to be accomplished 
first was for all organizations to agree on the requirements of the program. Not only was 
this viewed as an important place to start the program with the contractors, it was viewed 
as a beneficial input to the developing of the baseline for IBR.  
The second deviation SASSA implemented was two-fold. The first was 
the choice to generate the technical milestone entry and exit criteria within the team, 
rather than simply use the milestone event checklists available in the standard SE 
guidance texts. The second was to develop the criteria 8-12 weeks before the event rather 
than before the program started and formalize it in a SEP type document.  This was 
obviously in part because the SASSA program did not have a standard SEMP or SEP. 
However, every effort was made to consult current industry best practices and standard 
SE guidance checklists for milestone content and criteria as inputs from which SASSA 
entry and exit criteria were tailored.  
The next deviation SASSA made was regarding participation by subject 
matter experts who are independent of the program. SASSA did not accomplish this in a 
strict sense where a completely independent team is brought in to assess a design review 
or technical milestone. Rather, SASSA did rely on the Aerospace Corporation “matrix” 
personnel. These are FFRDC technical experts in various fields who can be hired by the 
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government team to assess the maturity of a particular area. SASSA also invited members 
of organizations who showed interest in the SASSA program from various locations 
within the military to participate in major reviews. SASSA made routine use of these 
experts throughout the program in all major design reviews. These personnel then acted 
as pseudo independent (attended repeated events) evaluation sources as the same people 
for certain niche fields would be brought in but who did not work the program in a day-
to-day manner.  
The final modification that SASSA made from standard SE guidance was 
to not adopt the systematic, incremental build up of lower level units or segments into a 
system level technical milestone event (PDR & CDR). For example, in the SASSA 
structure for IDR (SASSA’s PDR like event), this would have looked like a mini-PDR or 
technical review at each of the unit levels (CIU, RWR, MCU-110, Ground Units, etc), 
followed by a segment-level PDR review for Space, Ground, and Testbed, all 
culminating in a System PDR. While standard SE guidance and good design practice 
(especially for large programs), this approach was viewed as an extremely time- and 
resource-intensive approach. For SASSA, the benefits did not outweigh the costs to the 
program, which would likely have put meeting the 24-month schedule at significant risk. 
6. Integrated Product Team (IPT) Structures  
a. Description of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) in Standard SE 
Sources 
A very common and pervasive standard SE guidance, including in space 
acquisitions at SMC, is the use of Integrated Product Teams or IPTs.  One source 
describes the genesis of IPTs by saying:  
IPTs evolved as a response to “stove-piped” engineering organizations in 
which producibility or reliability specialists, as examples, might NOT be 
integrated into the design activity with the result that the associated 
constraints might be given inadequate attention or “band-aided” late in the 
development with a resultant lack of balance in the design.” (SMC SE 
Primer, p. 35)  
IPTs form organizations into functional or logical groups for the purposes 
of better cross-organizational communication. Government program-management teams 
and contractor teams alike are almost exclusively arranged or are required to be arranged 
in an IPT structure. Each IPT in this structure has a government and contractor lead. 
These IPTs can be very formalized, with a charter, schedule, and deliverables between 
IPTs; or they can be very informal, put together for a short period to address a specific 
issue or problem (as in the use of “tiger teams”). Figure 9 illustrates the SMC SE 
Primer’s example of a generic IPT implementation (Figure 46. IPT Typical 
Organizational Structure, p.149)  
 
 
Figure 9.    Typical Organizational Structure 
Direction for use of IPTs in SE guidance texts is pervasive. The INCOSE 
SE handbook (p. 185–195), discusses at length the historical transition from development 
done in series (one task accomplished before the next) to IPTs with recognized benefits. 
As the IPT paradigm matured it led to the current Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) and Integrated Product Development Teams (IPDT) vernacular and 
process. Another SE guidance source, DoD Directive 5000.1, states in the Collaboration 
section that  “…programs shall maintain continuous and effective communications with 
each other by using Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)” (E1.1.2., Enclosure 1 p. 5). The 
SMC SE Primer similarly states:  
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The key organizational building blocks are Integrated Product Teams 
(IPTs) and cross-product teams such as System Engineering and 
Integration Teams (SEITs) ….Each Contractor IPT is assigned full 
Responsibility, Authority, and Accountability (RAA) for its assigned 
products. (p. 148).  
The Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, in sec 1.6.1, 
corroborates the theme by saying “A proven method of improving the efficiency of the 
development process is by establishing working groups and IPTs.” (p. 9) It also states 
“The program office should ensure that IPTs are employed on the program as an element 
of SE, SV SE, and subsystem and unit design management implementation.” (p. 9). 
Finally the DAG corroborates the above guidance and expands specifically on the SE role 
in IPTs with  
Systems engineering participates in the IPPD through a systems 
engineering working-level IPT (SE WIPT). The program lead or chief 
engineers should establish an SE WIPT to support the accomplishment of 
all systems engineering tasks and support efforts. (p. 172) 
b.  SASSA Tailored IPT Structure as Implemented 
(1)  SASSA Government Team Organization. The current 
SASSA government team program structure is highly a function of the SASSA programs 
growth over time. In the spring of 2007, a single Air Force officer was in charge of the 
“SASSA project.” SASSA was one of a dozen projects assigned to the Air Force officer 
to oversee. When SASSA received its requested funding, the officer was authorized to 
hire contracted Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA), Aerospace 
Corporation (FFRDC) technical support, and was authorized to utilize another junior 
officer, partial time, in the late summer and fall of 2007. This pattern followed as the 
project solidified in maturity and scope definition with the team following suit to its 
current size. From one officer full time, to two, then three and so on to its present size of 
three officers, one full-time aerospace, five full-time SETA support staff, and various 
part-time support specialty personal (i.e., scheduling and FFRDC technical specialty 
expertise).  
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Early in the program, there was a conscious choice to not 
implement an IPT structure. The SASSA program was an aggressive, fast-paced program 
with high expectations to deliver on. There was a lot to be accomplished with very little 
resources in the government office in just getting the project started. A strategy was 
adopted from the beginning that the entire team was responsible for knowing, reading, 
and accomplishing everything. The SASSA team operated as a “badgeless” team, 
adopting a flat organizational structure. For SASSA to be effective in starting up quickly 
then all people needed to work and to contribute in a variety of fields that crossed many 
traditional roles. In this manner, the entire team could be current on all events and 
involved in all decisions. Specific tasks were volunteered for or assigned to be executed 
by the officer in charge using the “best athlete” mentality. In this way, the team’s 
experience and skills were maximized across the program as everyone was exposed to 
everything. The best person for the job took the responsibility of accomplishing specific 
tasks or was assigned to specific tasks to maximize efficiency. This structure avoided 
personnel being able to “hide” under IPT titles and only do what was directly applicable 
to their IPT. Having these types of potential inefficiencies could create significant drains 
in a small team who needed everyone contributing across the board, regardless of IPT 
role.  
As the full scope of the SASSA program was realized, to include a 
dual contract award (later scaled back to one), two full SASSA systems being procured, 
and firm relationships on two separate host vehicles, it was clear greater organization was 
necessary. The total body of possible information on the program became too large for 
the previous “everyone knows everything” mentality. Thus, a pseudo IPT structure was 
adopted. This was pseudo in the sense that, for the first time in the SASSA organization 
structure, an individual was assigned a particular specialty. For SASSA, this was two 
individuals—a software lead and ground lead. Even in this new configuration with two 
focus area leads, there are still no IPTs. These individuals are responsible for their 
particular area but do not exist as or within an IPT, nor do they lead an IPT for that 
subject. All personnel still perform in a “floating” mode as cross program help, including 
these two leads, albeit in a secondary role. For example, multiple SETA staff have 
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experience in a variety of areas including program management, prior military acquisition 
experience, business, contracts, security, senior-level technical knowledge, and systems 
engineering. These personnel maintained a high resolution of knowledge on all aspects of 
the program and bolstered areas as needed, without existing in a specific IPT or lead role.  
(2) SASSA Contractor Team IPT structure. The SASSA 
program required both contractors to adopt a conventional IPT structure as part of the 
proposal process. This organizational structure remained throughout the contractor’s 
contractual period of performance. There was no modification of this aspect of standard 
SE guidance on the SASSA program.  
c.  Comparison of Standard Guidance to SASSA 
The SASSA program tailored standard SE guidance in one significant 
respect. This was to intentionally not adopt a strict IPT structure for the government team 
at any point in the program. Even currently, the structure reflects more that certain 
individuals have areas of focus rather than being the lead of an IPT element. This is also 
made clear by the lack of complete IPT elements across the current structure. For 
example, there is no space segment or single SE lead. The primary reason for SASSA 
government team not adopting a strict IPT structure was an attempt to implement a 
strategy to better maximize the efficiency of the government team in accomplishing the 
large amounts of diverse work. 
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V.  EVALUATION OF SASSA TAILORED SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses the standard SE processes that have been tailored for their 
contributions, positively and negatively, towards achieving a rapid space acquisition in 
the SASSA program. The utility of this assessment is aimed at providing 
recommendations for utilization of selected tailored SE processes for similar acquisition 
projects, as well as capture historical information for the reader. The lessons learned on 
this program, specific to a rapid space acquisition and the unique attempts made in both 
effort and methodology, may be of usefulness for similar programs in the future.  
B.  STANDARD CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING TAILORED PROCESSES 
This section identifies criteria by which each of the tailored SE processes can be 
judged against in assessing whether the process was a positive or negative contribution in 
accomplishing the SASSA rapid space acquisition. These criteria describe various aspects 
of value in the tailored processes. The criteria are:  
 Meeting program technical or programmatic objectives 
 Reducing cost  
 Maintaining or shortening schedule  
 Contributing to the ease of the SE process  
 Contributing to the quality of the SE process 
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C.  SASSA TAILORED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
EVALUATION   
1.  Requirements Development   
The major deviations from the SE guidance for Requirements Development are 
summarized as: 
 SASSA did not utilize the JCIDS (ICD or CDD) or their development 
approaches as suggested in SE guidance  
 SASSA did not have any formal stakeholder input  
 SASSA did not utilize formal KPP/KPA’s at the government level 
 
The tailored implementations by SASSA are summarized as: 
 
 SASSA assumed the congressional language as a starting place and developed 
program objectives and a TRD traceable to these objectives 
 SASSA applied internal expertise and understanding of SSA to the needs of 
the SASSA system in requirements development 
 SASSA utilized a minimum number of requirements in the TRD 
 SASSA utilized an Excel spreadsheet to capture requirements traceability, 
capabilities, and verification information for ease of assessment and 
effectiveness 
 SASSA developed a three volume SASSA SIS ICD for instrument and SV 
hosts to understand the SASSA interfaces  
 
The approach the SASSA program implemented for tailoring the standard SE 
guidance for the requirements development process approach was assessed as very 
successful towards completing the rapid space acquisition. The process tailoring enabled 
the program to develop sufficient requirements for the rapid acquisition quickly. The 
process rigorously decomposed these requirements and ensured appropriate mapping 
from the original congressional language, to the programs core objectives, to the TRD 
requirements. Total program cost and schedule was saved through implementing wise 
choices in software tools, which optimized efficiency of assessment and depth of SE 
review. Establishing a minimum number of TRD requirements also streamlined efforts 
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and reduced total requirements management overhead. This rapid process established 
solid requirements quickly, allowing the program to contribute to future SASSA 
programs’ SE effort in the development of the SIS ICD volumes.  In summary, the 
program was able to complete all the requirement documents to ensure that all the design 
reviews were completed on schedule.  The requirements development process completely 
captured the customer needs, which are currently being verified as part of system tests. 
The results of the tailored processes only contributed to efficiency and expediency in the 
overall acquisition.   
2. Functional Architecture Design and Synthesis  
The major deviations from the SE guidance for Functional Architecture and 
Design Synthesis are summarized as: 
  
 SASSA constrained the possible architecture and synthesis solutions by 
constraining implementations with the technical requirements 
 
The tailored implementations by SASSA are summarized as: 
 SASSA performed an analysis of alternative type study with a reference 
system design 
 SASSA implemented a particular architecture as a starting place for contractor 
design including a secondary payload configuration, high TRL hardware, and 
defined payload elements with space, ground, and testbed segment 
delineations  
 
The approach the SASSA program implemented for tailoring the standard SE 
guidance for the Functional Architecture and Design Synthesis process was assessed as 
very successful towards completing the rapid space acquisition. The tailored process 
constrained the scope of the problem to be solved given the funding, schedule, and 
resources available. This focused contractor efforts that aided in maintaining efficient 
expenditure of cost and schedule resources in achieving a successful design 
implementation. The decision to make some of the design synthesis choices within the 
government office as a starting place moved the contractor design implementation farther 
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along the developmental process that was advantageous in meeting the rapid acquisition 
timeline. Achieving this design earlier in the timeline also allowed more rigorous SE 
review earlier in the program. Given the constraints as well as the specific set of 
instruments the SASSA team gave to the contractor, it eliminated any trade analysis 
and/or indecisions. This could have cost the program precious time in the architecture 
definition phase and delayed the start of specific design.  Overall, this tailored process 
used by SASSA is assessed to have been a critical positive contributor, essential in 
achieving successes in the program this far in completing the rapid space acquisition.  
3. Standard Systems Engineering Plans 
The major deviations from the SE guidance for use of Standard Systems 
Engineering Plans are summarized as: 
 
 SASSA did not develop a standard SEP/SEMP, SEMS and/or SEDS 
 SASSA did not require their contractors to develop, maintain, and update a 
standard government approved SEP/SEMP, SEMS and SEDS  
 
The tailored implementations by SASSA are summarized as: 
 
 SASSA captured SE methodologies by implementing a multipronged 
approach: 
o RFP evaluation criteria for processes for Systems Engineering and  
Software Engineering Management 
o Contractor’s proposal response to the RFP for these criteria; this 
articulated the contractors process and plan without requiring a 
standard SEMP 
o (IMS) – this captured major SE milestones and interrelations to 
other critical events 
o Specification of required government approved contractual 
deliveries (CDRLs) CM, PMP, and SDP 
o Team decided before program execution how it would execute SE 
in the program – captured in a briefing  
 
The approach the SASSA program implemented for tailoring the standard SE 
guidance for utilizing Standard Systems Engineering Plans was assessed as very 
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successful towards completing the rapid space acquisition. This SASSA process 
implementation is an excellent example of how SASSA was able to effectively tailor a 
standard SE process to make positive contributions towards a rapid space acquisition. 
The upfront RFP planning and acquisition requirements which the contractors had to 
respond to, as well as the discussions as to how the SASSA team would manage the 
development contracts accomplished the objectives of a standard SEMP/SED without the 
expenditure of the associated lengthy time and resources.  Additionally, the contractor 
proposed to leverage a standard SEMP from company “Command Media,” which helped 
set the framework of how to conduct business.  This was stated at the program kick-off 
and agreed to by the SASSA program office, which eliminated the need for a lengthy 
SEMP development activity.  Overall, the tailored approach implemented by SASSA 
ensured SE objectives for the program were met, shortened the overall schedule by 
reducing the overall tasks to be accomplished, and contributed to cost savings by 
optimizing time and task expenditures. 
4. Use of Systems Engineering Leads  
The major deviations from the SE guidance for the use of Systems Engineering 
Leads are summarized as: 
 SASSA did not appoint or use a SE lead in the government team 
 
The tailored implementations by SASSA are summarized as: 
 SASSA performed SE as a group and by consensus on the government team 
 
The approach the SASSA program implemented for tailoring the standard SE 
guidance for the use of Systems Engineering Leads was assessed as a neutral contribution 
towards completing the rapid space acquisition.  The SASSA program was able to 
execute and maintain excellent SE oversight, but it could not be attributed to the process 
tailoring.  Rather the SASSA team exploited an advantageous situation with many on the 
SASSA team having education and predisposition for doing systems engineering. A 
program that chooses to implement this same tailoring approach risks not ensuring that 
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adequate expertise in SE is a part of the program or that adequate SE work is being 
accomplished on the program. The conclusion is the successes on the SASSA program in 
this area were due more to the team composition than the tailoring of the standard SE 
process.  This approach should be viewed as a risk for any program considering this 
implementation, noting that success is critically dependant on team composition 
throughout the life of the program. 
5. Technical Reviews 
The major deviations from the SE guidance for Technical Reviews are 
summarized as: 
 
 SASSA milestones were out of order from guidance   
 SASSA did not develop entry and exit criteria before the program was started 
nor did it put it in the SEM or SEMP 
 SASSA did not use a completely independent team to review technical 
milestones  
 SASSA did not use incremental milestone reviews from unit to system for 
PDR and CDR 
 
The tailored implementations by SASSA are summarized as: 
 
 SASSA performed SRR before IBR as its first major milestone 
 SASSA developed entry and exit criteria within the government team 8-12 
wks prior to the event 
 SASSA utilized FFRDC and outside organizational experts for IDR/CDR 
(with every review) 
 SASSA held a single milestone event for all elements with exception of 
Software at SRR (SSR) 
 SASSA performed a rigorous early technical review preparation process (30 
day plan) 
 
The approach the SASSA program implemented for tailoring the standard SE 
guidance for Technical Reviews was assessed as very successful towards completing the 
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rapid space acquisition. The first positive contribution from the modification of this 
guidance by SASSA is an early aligning and understanding by the contractor of the 
system requirements.  This was a critical factor is setting the program off on the right foot 
for both a technical understanding and the opportunity to plan the program resources.  
The next benefit of the tailored guidance was the use of “semi-independent” experts to 
review material at the SASSA milestones. This outside perspective added to the rigor of 
each event in ensuring adequate SE and design principles had been used.  An additional 
benefit to the SASSA tailored guidance was in saving schedule and resources (ultimately 
cost) by not performing incremental technical review events preceding the system 
technical reviews. SASSA was able to take advantage of its smaller system and still 
accomplish rigorous technical reviews. The final positive contribution was the technical 
event preparation and review process developed by the SASSA team. This process 
allowed for early review and approval prior to the event, which allowed for more 
efficient maintenance of technical momentum in the program and minimizing the risk of 
significant schedule delays. This also ensured the meeting of program objectives by 
upfront review as a forcing function for maturity assessment. By uncovering issues early 
in milestone preparation process SASSA minimized the risk of spending time and 
resources addressing design issues and actions items discovered for the first time at the 
event.  
The SASSA program could have been even more efficient if had followed the 
aspect of the standard guidance for completing the entry and exit criteria before the 
program start as well as described the milestone event-review preparation process. This 
would have allowed the contractor to plan accordingly with time and resources. This may 
have contributed to reducing the current cost overrun in the SE cost element in the 
program.  
Overall, the process tailoring by the SASSA program for Technical Milestones 
was beneficial in the success of maintaining the milestone schedule of events from kick-
off through CDR and ensuring in depth SE and design reviews.  
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6. Integrated Product Team (IPT) Structures 
The major deviations from the SE guidance for the use of Integrated Product 
Team’s (IPT) are summarized as: 
 SASSA government team did not utilize a rigid IPT structure, even late into 
the program 
The tailored implementations by SASSA are summarized as: 
 SASSA utilized a flat, organizationally “badgeless” team 
The approach the SASSA program implemented for tailoring the standard SE 
guidance for utilizing IPTs was assessed as very successful towards completing the rapid 
space acquisition. The implementation of the “flat” organizational structure was a 
significant positive contribution to the overall SASSA rapid acquisition. The lack of strict 
IPT stovepipes allowed synergy among the few team members, which was critical to 
accomplishing the large volume and technical depth in a variety of fields in a short time. 
It allowed all members of the team a holistic view of the program as all members were 
current on all topics. It efficiently used the resources of the team and minimized the 
tendency to focus only on an individual IPT or subject.  Overall, the SASSA modification 
of the SE guidance to implement IPTs was assessed to be a great positive contributor 
towards achieving this rapid space acquisition. The composition of the SASSA team and 
individual traits of the members allowed for a more beneficial application of resources in 
executing the program than could be had by implementing an IPT structure.  
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Table 15 summarizes the assessment of the SASSA tailored standard SE guidance 
and indicates its contribution towards accomplishing a rapid space acquisition.  
Modified SE 
Process 
SASSA Modifications Benefits Risks Contribution 
Requirements 
Development 
- No JCIDS process 
involvement/ utilization 
- No formal stakeholder 
involvement 
- No KPP/KPA’s 
- Strong traceability 
from goals to req.’s 
- Clear traceability 
from original goals 
to req.’s 
- Allowed program 
to move more 
quickly than a JCIDs 
program 
- Potential lack of 
insight into final 
capability with no 
interim KPP/KPA 
assessment 
- Output capability of 











- Gov imposed design 
aspects (TRL, HW 
units, heritage req.’s) 





- Focus program on 
likely solutions 
- High probability of 
plausible options 
- Miss inventive or 
creative solutions 






- No government or 
contractor SEP,SEMP, 
SEMS, or SEDS 
- Use of RFP, IMS, 
CDRLs for SE process 
- Program meetings to 
define processes 
- Use of Contractor 
processes 
- Saved resources for 
Gov and contractor 
- Less documentation 
- Less overall tasks 
- Gov does not see 
potential deficient SE 
plans of contractor 
- Gov is unclear on 










- No dedicated SE lead 
on government team 
- Team SE process 




- Lack of adequate 
SE 
- Inconsistent SE  
process 
- Critically dependant 





- SRR before IBR 
- Entry/Exit criteria not 
generated before 
program initiation 
- Criteria not in 
SEM(P) 
- No completely 
independent  reviewers 








program needs from 
the start 
- Save resources 
- Thorough reviews 
 
- Contractor not 
understanding  tech 
event criteria in 
planning resources 
for baseline 
- Under scope 
resources 
- Too much in one 
review for larger 
programs 











- “Flat”, versatile 
government team 
structure vice IPT 
structure 
- More expertise 
exposed to more 
tasks  
- surge capability for 
quick task 
completion 
- Entire team up to 
date on critical issues 
- Counteracts stove 
piped thinking 
- Good fit for 
minimal Gov 
resources 
- Entire team aware 
of program status 
- Too much 
information for all to 
absorb as program 
grows 
- Lack of ability to 
have needed depth in 
focused area in large 
programs 
- Lack of consistent 
follow 
through/tracking of 










Table 15.   Summary of Tailored Standard Systems Engineering Processes 
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VI.  APPLICATION OF STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study would not be of any use or utility, in the view of the researcher, if it 
were not for some possibility of practical application that has the ability to live beyond 
the simple historical analysis of the SASSA program.  The first and foremost intention 
for the application of this study is for similar programs to be able to observe elements of 
the SASSA program, learn from the perceived successes and failures, and make informed 
decisions for how to optimize their program. The second intention is to provide useful 
information for the general education of the systems engineering community in order to 
stay current and relevant in the current application of SE on a DoD space program.  
Space acquisitions is a dynamic and changing field and will only become more so as our 
reliance on and capabilities in space drive greater and greater population of space.  Threat 
warning capability for satellites is currently on the verge of universal propagation to the 
same degree that is prevalent on terrestrial airframes and military ships. Understanding 
how SE is being applied in the far corners of the growing fields of acquisitions is 
essential to staying relevant and current. The third intention for the application of this 
study is to provide readily usable recommendations for rapid-paced acquisitions. The 
final intention is to provide feedback and recommendations for the improvement of the 
overall DoD acquisitions process, specifically in the early Prephase A portions of 
development and systems engineering.  
B.  OBSERVATIONS 
 Most standard, military based SE guidance is primarily SE technical management 
(vice SE processes) 
 Most industry SE guidance is so high level it is either not useful or difficult to 
apply/implement in a DoD military acquisition 
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 There is little if any SE guidance for non JCIDs/formal acquisitions, despite a 
large number of military programs falling outside this realm 
 The apparent source of SE processes (not technical management guidance) 
knowledge is either learned by experience, found in contractor “command 
media,” or learned in academia. This relegates SE learning by handing down 
“over the campfire” by those more experienced who tutor younger engineers or 
via higher education 
 Standard SE guidance must be tailored/deviated from to achieve a rapid 
acquisition 
 Team composition is equally as important as the tailoring of standard SE 
processes in rapid space acquisitions 
 By not providing directly applicable standard guidance, the larger DoD 
acquisition system creates an inherent risk and inefficiency by allowing non 
JCIDS type, smaller programs to “fly under the radar” of current SE guidance 
 Adherence to good SE processes is as important as having defined good SE 
processes 
 Value added should be the strict criteria for whether or not a tailored or standard 
SE process is implemented 
 “Better” is the enemy of “good enough” 
 Tailoring, where possible, should apply lessons learned from other acquisition 
activities 
 Rapid space acquisition s requires experienced and SE knowledgeable personnel – 
these programs are too short and consequences to dire to learn on the job 
 Rapid space acquisition requires strong SE leadership to focus effort 
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Recommendations for the Systems Engineering Community 
 Perform a survey of SE guidance for military acquisitions and ensure there is 
comprehensive coverage of SE processes (as opposed to SE technical 
management). 
o Publish a Primer which points to or consolidates this “how to do SE in the 
military” for ease of use and proliferation, focused on SE processes. 
 
 Create a new SE guidance or append the present guidance which would 
instruct on how to practically implement and accomplish SE processes on 
non-formal/non JCID’s programs. 
 Create a new SE guidance or append the present guidance for 
recommendations on how to tailor standard guidance for non-formal/ non 
JCIDs programs. 
o Address the importance and relationship of the large number of small 
technology and acquisition efforts to the larger formal programs and 
JCIDS process. Good SE is needed even in these small programs to be 
efficient in technology maturation as it relates to larger programs. 
 
 Continue to instruct in basic SE application and build a strong foundational 
knowledge of accomplishing SE processes in SE students. 
o Advocate for high levels of practical implementation instruction for doing 




2.  Recommendations for Accomplishing Rapid Space Acquisitions 
 Observe and consider the positive contributions made on the SASSA program 
by tailoring standard SE guidance  
 Tailor standard SE guidance and choose quality teams using “value added” as 
a prime criteria 
 Ensure processes proposed are followed throughout acquisition regardless of 
if they were tailored or not  
 Assemble teams that have experienced and SE knowledgeable personnel as a 
“non-negotiable” 
 Ensure processes proposed are followed throughout acquisition, regardless of 
if they were tailored or not 
 Provide strong SE leadership on the team  
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Recommended areas of further research fall into two main areas. The first is to 
take the assessments of tailored processes and compare them for validity to other 
programs of like size and scope. This undertaking would aid in determining whether the 
assessments of the tailored processes were accurate, whether the results were repeatable 
as evidenced by other programs, or whether additional processes could be added to the 
recommendations. Greater confidence in the recommendations of this study could be 
achieved if it is compared to a body of programs rather than this single instance.  
The second area of additional research is to expand on the concept of developing 
standard SE processes guidance for smaller, Prephase A programs. This study could 
develop a series of aspects to include the validation of the link between smaller programs 
and standard JCID milestone programs (i.e., feeder programs), a more complete survey of 
material for guidance on smaller programs, or creating a draft of guidance that addresses 
various solutions for how standard SE guidance might look for smaller programs.  
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APPENDIX A. ACQUISITION DESCRIPTION SUMMARY 
This brief summary is intended to accomplish two things. The first is to provide a 
working knowledge of formal acquisitions processes in the DoD as a context for the rest 
of the study. The second is to capture the somewhat unusual acquisition process SASSA 
has experienced relative to the formal JCIDS acquisition process in the DoD. It is worth 
noting, for background information, what the typical acquisition process is and its phases, 
what the normal products of each phase would be, and how SASSA differed. This will 
serve as a backdrop for the entire study, keeping in mind the focus of the study is to 
investigate the modification of typical SE processes. 
A quick refresher on DoD acquisition process is helpful in understanding how the 
SASSA program differed in its start up. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff 
Instruction, JCSI 3170.01C, 24 June 2003 establishes the policies and procedures of the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (SMC SE Primer, p. 39). 
The JCIDS development system is the current DoD architecture in which all major 
acquisitions are implemented. Included in this system is a means by which DoD 
acquisition needs are identified, investigated, and then flowed down further in the 
process. This top-down needs-identification process is depicted in the SMC SE Primer. 
 
JCIDS top-down capability need identification process (SMC SE Primer, p. 40)  
 
Once top-level needs have been identified, they are flowed to the next phase of 
the JCIDS process. The entire life cycle of the JCIDS process is  depicted in both a 
simplified functional sense, as well as in the formal steps, as depicted in figures 1.6-1 and 
2.2-1 (SV SE Handbook). In general, the entire JCIDS process is broken into three major 
milestone phases: A, B, and C (SMC SE Primer, figure 12). Each phase is preceded by 
standardized and gated processes that have to be approved by the major authority placed 
over the acquisition.  
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(SMC SE Primer, p. 41) Simplified JCIDS Milestone Steps 
 
The formal JCIDS process can be described in detail in many sources, however 
the relevant aspect for this study is the initial phase where requirements have been 
identified or need to be identified and are initiated in the JCIDS process. In the JCIDS 
vernacular this is the Pre-milestone A phase or Prephase A. This phase, as with each of 
the phases, has a prescribed set of content that needs to be addressed and approved to 
move to the next phase.  
The SV SE handbook describes the content that Prephase A is intended to capture 
by stating,  
Prephase A is characterized by development and evaluation of alternative 
concepts to the systems, a top-level description of needed capabilities (i.e., 
initial capabilities document), and definition of the CONOPS for those 
capabilities. Prephase A begins the capabilities/requirements evolution 
strategy and activities to develop and manage the requirements and 
documents. (sec 2.2.1.1.1.1., p. 22).  
The key aspect of this phase is that it is forward looking to technology maturity 
and capability development in the form of hardware design and build. This means that all 
the activities are primarily planning and analysis based, resulting in documentation and 
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direction for future development of hardware. This brief summary is sufficient at this 
point to provide an adequate context of understanding for the rest of this study without 
describing the remaining aspects of the DoD JCIDS process. 
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APPENDIX B.  DEFINITION OF TERMS 
This study makes repeated use of terminology that needs to be defined in order to 
create a common understanding for the reader. The concepts discussed here are not 
intended to establish new definitions in the larger acquisition community but is strictly 
focused to guide the reader to understand the intended meaning behind commonly used 
phraseology in the following chapters and sections.  
 
Typical or Standard: Used to indicate that a particular systems engineering process is 
articulated in a published and established text viewed by industry or the military as a 
standard or reference text. 
 
Tailored: Used to indicate that a typical or standard systems engineering process has 
been changed in some form or implementation from that which was originally described 
or defined in the original source guidance text.  
 
Effective: Used to indicate that a particular tailored standard process or unique process 
implemented was advantageous towards the overall goal of completing the SASSA rapid 
acquisition as close to the ideal as defined by a) the original baselined delivery date of 
October 2010; b) the original baselined cost estimate as defined at contract award and c) 
the baselined functional and performance capability defined in the government technical 
requirements document placed on contract. The antonym of this phraseology will also be 
utilized in this study to describe SE processes implemented that have the opposite effect.  
 
Success or Successfully Implemented: Used here to capture a judgment that a particular 
tailored or unique SE process implemented in the SASSA program significantly 
contributed to the current state of the SASSA program. In this study, all SE processes 
implemented that positively contribute towards meeting the goal of the rapid acquisition 
are deemed successful. There is an inherently subjective nature to this type of judgment. 
As such, in all cases possible there will be a quantifiable justification made. In other 
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cases, this will not be possible and will have to rest on the logic of the case made for a 
positive contribution to completing the SASSA program on its ideal objectives for 
schedule, cost, and capability as defined in the contract. The antonym of this phraseology 
will also be utilized in this study to describe SE processes implemented that have the 
opposite effect.  
 
Acquisition Product: Used here to capture the complete set of resulting products of an 
acquisition program. This includes all hardware, software, study results and analysis, and 
resulting experience.  
 
Rapid Acquisition: Used here to denote a contractually obligated acquisition effort that, 
relatively speaking, attempts to complete either a typical amount of “acquisition product” 
on a compressed schedule or an above average amount of “acquisition product” on a 
typical schedule. Typical here is a subjective judgment for what appears to be standard 
for the industry of space acquisition and at the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC). 
For example, it is not typical to deliver flight hardware in two years. This would be 
considered an aggressive schedule. To deliver two fully integrated flight payload systems 
with space, ground, and testbed segments is very A-typical for the space acquisition 
standard, including at SMC. 
 
Program and Project: In the standard sense of definitions derived from standard SE 
guidance texts programs and projects are different. The Aerospace Corporation SV SE 
Handbook provides these definitions where “a project is an effort with a specific 
objective and end point. For example, a project might be to develop, launch, operate, and 
dispose of a SV. By contrast, a program is an ongoing effort, without a defined end, that 
may involve a number of projects. GPS is an example of a program. In common usage, 
these terms are often used interchangeably.” (p. 21). By the standard definition, SASSA 
is a project, but is referred to in common usage as a program in this study.  
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Payload: The term payload is used here to denote a set of units on a larger satellite space 
vehicle, which function together for a specific purpose. Satellites often have primary and 
secondary payloads.   
 
Spacecraft or Bus: This term is used to identify the elements of a satellite, which are not 
the payloads. It includes the flight computer, power, attitude control, solar panels, etc.  
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